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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 A Biophysical Perspective
All theory depends on assumptions which are not quite true.
That is what makes it theory.
– Robert Solow (1956, p. 65)
The purpose of this book is to begin thinking about what a biophysical growth
theory might look like. All theories must start by excluding from their scope the
complexities of the real world that are deemed irrelevant. Such exclusion (or reduc-
tionism) makes scientific inquiry possible. For instance, prior to Isaac Newton, it
was assumed that objects in motion tended to eventually come to a rest. However,
by excluding the forces of friction from analysis, Newton was able to show that the
opposite was true: objects in motion tended to stay in motion unless acted upon by
an external force.
Yet excluding real-world complexities is a tricky business. If a theory excludes
from its scope the very forces that are causing the behavior in question, we have
a problem. In this case, over-judicious simplification becomes a crutch: it makes
mathematical formalization possible, but yields a model that has little to do with
reality. Only through rigorous empirical investigation (and not through logical de-
duction) can one distinguish between good and bad assumptions.
Thus, the most appropriate starting point for a biophysical growth theory is to
investigate the validity of assumptions made by existing growth theories. Since neo-
classical growth theory is the dominant approach at the present time, this book
empirically investigates neoclassical assumptions. The goal of this endeavor is to
decide upon the essential elements of the growth process and to compile a set of
stylized facts that a biophysical growth theory must successfully explain.
Not surprisingly, most existing growth theories are interested in explaining the
phenomenon of sustained exponential growth. But while exponential growth seems
‘normal’ to the modern observer, it is a historical anomaly. The vast majority of
human history has been characterized by stable equilibrium, not exponential growth.
Figure 1.1 shows two scenarios for the future. Economists typically assume a future
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Fig. 1.1 Two Different Visions of the Future
Sources: Modelled after Hall and Klitgaard (2012). Energy data for 1820-1960 from Smil (2010);
1965-2011 from BP Statistical Review of Energy, 2012. (Energy data includes oil, gas and coal)
like Scenario A, with an indefinite continuation of exponential growth. Geologist
M. King Hubbert, on the other hand, envisions a future like Scenario B, in which
exponential growth is a “transient phenomenon in human history” (1993).
Hubbert realized that the most important energy source used by industrial soci-
eties – fossil fuels – was finite, irreplaceable, and subject to inevitable depletion.
He famously predicted the 1970 peak in US oil production, and made predictions
that global oil production would peak around the year 2000. While recent evidence
suggests that his prediction was slightly early (Hallock et al, 2014), the exact timing
of these events is less important than the realization that they will occur, and that
humanity’s energy future is far more likely to resemble Scenario B than Scenario A.
Hubbert also noted that when we are far from the limits to growth, the unbounded
exponential, Gaussian (bell-shape), and logistic (S-shape) curves are indistinguish-
able from one another. Thus, for a large portion of the pre-peak era, theories based
on unbounded growth will accurately describe reality. It is only as we near the peak
that theories of unbounded growth will fail. Even though Scenario B is only hypo-
thetical, note that it departs from Scenario A in the early 21st century. Interestingly,
at the present time the sluggish growth of many countries is perplexing many main-
stream economists. Biophysical scholars such as Hall and Klitgaard (2012) suggest
that we are nearing the limits to growth. Given this reality, a growth theory that will
remain relevant in the future must explain both growth and forced degrowth.
When testing neoclassical assumptions, it is important to recognize that neo-
classical economists are often acutely aware that their assumptions are “not quite
true”. Indeed, in his 1956 paper outlining the foundations of neoclassical growth
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theory, Robert Solow acknowledges this in his first sentence (see opening quota-
tion).1 However, Solow and other neoclassical theorists typically regard such untrue
assumptions as ‘innocuous’ – a necessary part of constructing a theory. This book
is concerned with the possibility that assumptions that are perceived as innocuously
untrue (by neoclassical theorists) are actually insidiously untrue. This will be the
case if neoclassical assumptions exclude from analysis the very phenomena that are
most central to the growth process. The empirical work conducted in this book aims
to find out whether or not this is the case.
1.2 Neoclassical Growth Theory
There are many variants of neoclassical growth theory, but this book focuses on the
Solow-Swan model, the ‘workhorse model of macroeconomics’ (Acemoglu, 2008,
p. 26). This model bears the name of its two main contributors, Robert Solow (1956;
1957) and Trevor Swan (1956). In his textbook, Introduction to Modern Economic
Growth, Daron Acemoglu writes that this model has “shaped the way [neoclassical
economists] approach not only economic growth but also the entire field of macroe-
conomics” (ibid, p. 26).
While the Solow-Swan model is now the canonical approach used in macro-
economics, it is important to recognize that it came into existence as a critique of an
earlier post-Keynesian model of growth put forward by Harrod (1939) and Domar
(1946). As Hagemann notes, the Harrod-Domar model was characterized by a “sec-
ular instability problem, which [was] thoroughly Keynesian in spirit and a kind of
extension of the unemployment problem to the long run” (2009, p. 72). The Harrod-
Domar model emphasized the basic instability of capitalist growth – a topic that was
freshly in mind when the model was developed (shortly after the Great Depression).
Solow began his model by accepting “all the Harrod-Domar assumptions except
that of fixed proportions” (1956, p.66). By doing away with fixed proportions and al-
lowing substitution between the factors of production (labor and capital) Solow was
able to create a model in which stability, rather than instability, was the norm. This
stability was a highly desirable feature for a neoclassical model because it meshed
well with the neoclassical tenet that the free market is inherently self-regulating.
Hall and Klitgaard note that this allowed Solow to “turn a social problem [insta-
bility] into a technical one, and [maintain] the neoclassical ideal of self-regulating
markets over the long term” (2012, p. 127). Thus, we can see that the assump-
tions underlying neoclassical growth theory are not random; rather, they are chosen
specifically to produce a model that is consistent with neoclassical principles.
1 Interestingly, Solow was referring to assumptions made by the Harrod-Domar model (not his
own assumptions). In the same paragraph, he continues: “When the results of a theory seem to
flow specifically from a special crucial assumption, then if the assumption is dubious, the results
are suspect” (1956, p. 65). While his aim is the Harrod-Domar assumption of fixed factor propor-
tions, one can also argue (as I do in this book) that the results of the Solow-Swan model are also
dependent on ‘dubious’ assumptions.
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The Solow-Swan model assumes an economy populated by homogeneous house-
holds and firms, such that each can be represented in aggregate by a single household
and a single firm. Households own the two factors of production (labor and capital)
and rent them to firms for use in production. Investment (and thus, capital accumu-
lation) is a function of the household savings rate, which is assumed to be constant.
The single sector economy produces one unique good, which is both consumed and
used as capital for further production.
At the core of this model is a neoclassical aggregate production function, which
usually takes Cobb-Douglas form:2
Y = ALβKα (1.1)
Here Y refers to the annual quantity of final output, L the quantity of labor input,
K the quantity of capital input, and A a dimensionless multiplier of the production
function (sometimes called “total factor productivity”) considered to represent tech-
nological change. The Cobb-Douglas production function is a simple method of
mapping the ‘factors of production’ (i.e. inputs) onto output in a way that satisfies
the requirements of neoclassical theory. Curiously, it does not include any consider-
ation of the necessary requirements of energy or materials.
A central tenet of neoclassical distribution theory is that each factor of production
should receive income in proportion to its marginal productivity. As a result of this
theory, the exponents in the production function are predicted to equal the income
share of each factor. Thus, α represents capital’s share of national income and β la-
bor’s share. Both sum to one, which guarantees ‘constant returns to scale’, meaning
changes in input are linearly related to changes in output. This is important because
a central ‘proof’ of the marginal productivity theory of distribution (the application
of Euler’s Theorem) only works under the assumption of constant returns to scale
(Robinson, 1934). Furthermore, the income shares of labor and capital are assumed
to be constant over time.
In order to maintain simplicity, the Solow-Swan model makes numerous assump-
tions (Table 1.1) that are clearly untrue. Yet the hope is that such assumptions merely
remove complexities of the real world that are not relevant to the growth process.
The result is a highly idealized model, that, while untrue in the strict sense, poten-
tially gives true insight into the core aspects of growth. The kernel of the Solow-
Swan model, which has remained the central tenet of all subsequent neoclassical
growth theories, is that growth is a stable process that is the result of capital accu-
mulation and technological progress (increases in the labor supply play a relatively
insignificant role).
The validity of this kernel, however, depends on the marginal role played by
the complexities that are assumed away. However, if these complexities are not
marginal, but rather, central to the growth process, results derived from the neo-
classical growth model may be grossly misleading. Therefore, it is of the utmost
2 This functional form owes its name to the work of Cobb and Douglas (1928), but the original use
of the equation dates back to the work of Wicksell (1911)[1901].
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Table 1.1 Explicit Assumptions Made by the Solow-Swan Model
Sources: Acemoglu (2008); Solow 1956.
1. Constant depreciation of capital
2. Closed economy (no trade)
3. Constant returns to scale
4. Constant savings rate
5. Diminishing marginal productivity of K, L
6. Incomes proportional to marginal produc-
tivity
7. Full employment
8. Free technology
9. Homogeneous households/firms
10. No debt financing
11. No government
12. Perfect competition
13. Profit maximization
14. Single commodity produced
15. Single economic sector
Table 1.2 Implicit Assumptions Made by the Solow-Swan Model
1. Economic output can become decoupled from energy inputs.
2. Economic distribution is unrelated to growth.
3. Large institutions are not important for growth.
4. Labor force structure is not important for growth.
importance to rigorously test such assumptions. Unfortunately, neoclassical theory,
for the most part, fails to do so.
This book does not test the explicit assumptions displayed in Table 1.1, but
rather, the implicit assumptions displayed in Table 1.2. All four of these implicit
assumptions follow logically from the explicit assumptions made by the Solow-
Swan model. By investigating these implicit assumptions, we are effectively testing
whether or not growth is as simple as neoclassical theory implies. If these four as-
sumptions turn out to be justified, then neoclassical growth theory stands on solid
ground. However, if these assumptions are not justified, then we must conclude that
neoclassical growth theory ignores processes that are essential to growth.
1.3 Methodological Approach: Relation to Existing Theory
The research that I have conducted in this book is based on a deep-seated dissatisfac-
tion with the state of conventional growth theory. My dissatisfaction is not unique.
Indeed, there is a long lineage of scholarship that has critiqued neoclassical growth
theory from a variety of perspectives. Below, I review a few of these schools of
thought and situate my own approach within this scholastic backdrop.
The Biophysical Critique
We begin with critiques of neoclassical growth theory that come from a biophysical
perspective. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971) argued that the economy is a bio-
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physical entity that is subject to the laws of thermodynamics. However, Hall et al.
note that neoclassical theory “pays only marginal attention to the first and second
laws of thermodynamics” (2001, p. 664). Herman Daly argues that the absence of
resources in the typical neoclassical production function is like a recipe that calls
for “making a cake with only the cook and his kitchen” (1997, p, 261).
Some scholars have pursued ways of reforming neoclassical growth theory by
integrating natural resources into the Cobb-Douglas production function (Stiglitz,
1974). However, one of the difficulties with this approach is that certain neoclas-
sical conditions conspire to make resources unimportant. Neoclassical distribution
theory predicts that the exponents in the production function (the ‘elasticities of
output’) should be equal to each factor of production’s share of income. But since
resource owners typically get paid only a tiny fraction of the national product, re-
source exponents must be small. Thus, if one adopts strict neoclassical conditions,
resources will inherently be given little significance (Ayres and Warr, 2005).
Because of this problem, scholars who add natural resources to production func-
tions have often had to abandon the neoclassical connection between output elas-
ticities and income shares. Ayres and Warr note that “including a fossil energy flow
proxy in the neoclassical production function, without any constraint on factor share,
seems to account for economic growth quite accurately, at least for limited time pe-
riods, without any exogenous time-dependent term” (2005, p. 182). Examples of
this ‘reformed’ production function approach include Hannon and Joyce (1981),
Ku¨mmel (1982; 1989), Cleveland et al. (1984), Ku¨mmel et al. (1985; 2000), Kauf-
man (1992), and Beaudreau (1998).
Along with the addition of energy as a factor of production (and the abandon-
ment of the factor share assumption) it has become common to replace the Cobb-
Douglas production function with a linear-exponential (‘LINEX’) production func-
tion (Ku¨mmel 1989, Hall et al., 2001, Ayres and Warr, 2005; 2009). In the work of
Ayres and Warr, the LINEX production function takes the following form:
Y = AUexp
(
α
L
U
−βU +L
K
)
(1.2)
Here α is a constant and U represents ‘useful work’, while the remainder of the
variables are the same as in the Cobb-Douglas function (Eq. 1.1). Note, however,
that α and β no longer represent capital and labor’s share of income.
This approach has met with great empirical success. In my opinion, the most
significant achievement of the biophysical perspective has been to emphasize the
importance of energy to the growth process. My own work accepts this importance
as a central tenet. As such, when I say that I adopt a ‘biophysical perspective’, this
means that I focus on energy flows, and that I heed Georgescu-Roegen’s call to make
economic theory compatible with the laws of thermodynamics.
However, I believe that the ‘reformed’ production function approach does not go
far enough in its critique of neoclassical growth theory. As Shaikh notes, “The ag-
gregate production function is a fundamental[ly] neoclassical construct” (2005, p.
447). Indeed, Nobel Prize winning economist Edward Prescott states that “the neo-
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classical production function is the cornerstone of the theory and is used in virtually
all applied aggregate analyses” (1998, p. 532).
As discussed below, there are major difficulties with the use of production func-
tions. My worry is that by adopting a production function approach, one implicitly
accepts some of the neoclassical tenets that one is testing.
The Functional Form Critique
The functional form critique highlights fundamental problems with the basic form
of the Cobb-Douglas production function. For instance, Mayumi, Giampietro, and
Ramos-Martin critique Cobb-Douglas functions as being part of a “curve-fitting
fetishism in economics”(2012, p. 26). They argue that neoclassical production func-
tions violate dimensional rules:
Suppose that K, L, and Y are represented in terms of the US dollar. Since α +
(1−α) = 1, the dimension of the left-hand side, the US dollar, is compatible
with that of the right-hand side as a whole if A is a dimensionless pure number.
However, each term on the right-hand side (i.e., K and L ) does not make any
sense unless α = 0 or 1. Suppose α = 1/2; is there any operational meaning of√
100 $US , for example? Thus we are at a loss to understand the true reason
why the Cobb-Douglas specification is often used in economic science. (ibid, p.
26-27)
Perhaps the main reason for the continued use of production functions is that they
appear to ‘work’. By using such a function, one can make falsifiable predictions
that are confirmed by empirical evidence. However, these predictions are usually
not about growth itself, but rather, about the distribution of income. Neoclassical
growth theory predicts that the exponents α and β should be equivalent to each
factor’s share of income. Neoclassical theory defines the ‘output elasticity’ with
respect to labor (the change of output per change of labor input) as the marginal
product of labor ( ∂Y∂L ), times the amount of labor per unit of output (L/Y ):
Output Elasticity =
∂Y
∂L
· L
Y
= β (1.3)
Carrying out this operation on equation 1.1 yields the result that the exponent β is
the output elasticity with respect to labor. Neoclassical distribution theory predicts
that the wage rate (w) should be equal to the marginal product of labor:
w =
∂Y
∂L
(1.4)
Substituting equation 1.4 into equation 1.3 yields:
β =
wL
Y
(1.5)
Thus, neoclassical theory predicts that β is equal to labor’s share of output (wL/Y ).
Carrying out a similar operation shows that α is predicted to be capital’s share of
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income, and that α and β should sum to one. Using regressions of historical data,
economists have empirically estimated these exponents. Walters notes the results:
First, the sum of the coefficients usually approximates closely to unity. The lin-
earity of the production function seems to be a remarkably consistent finding
between one country and another. The second important result is the agreement
between the labour exponent and the share of wages in the value of output. These
two findings have been interpreted as confirmation that the aggregate production
function has constant returns to scale and that the marginal productivity of labour
is equal to the wage rate. (1963, p. 27)
For many economists, these strong empirical results justify the use of aggregate
production functions. However, Franklin Fisher argues that the empirical robustness
of the Cobb-Douglas production function is a paradox. Fisher has focused specifi-
cally on the conditions under which it is possible to move from firm-specific pro-
duction functions to an economy-wide aggregate production function. His findings
are not reassuring. He notes that “the conditions under which ... a technologically
diverse economy can be represented by an aggregate production function are far too
stringent to be believable” ( 1971, p. 305, emphasis added). In order to understand
why aggregate production functions appear to ‘work’ when they should not, Fisher
created a model in which the conditions for aggregation were purposefully not met.
Yet, to his surprise, as long as labor and capital shares were constant, he found that
a Cobb-Douglas function could be used to accurately fit aggregate data.
McCombie (2001) argues that the origin of this paradox stems from the use of
monetary data for empirical work. Neoclassical growth theory is derived from a
one-commodity thought experiment, in which both inputs and outputs can be mea-
sured in physical terms. However, the real-world application of the theory requires
that measurement be based on monetary value (since inputs and outputs are het-
erogeneous and cannot be aggregated in physical units). This resort to monetary
value means that the data used for analysis is generated using the national accounts
identity:
Y ≡ wL+ rK (1.6)
The national accounts are an accounting system used by government agencies to
measure, among other things, the ‘national wealth’ Y (i.e. total real value-added).
Equation 1.6 is one way of defining the national wealth. That is, total value-added
(Y ) is defined as the sum of all individual ‘real’ incomes. Grouping income by func-
tional type, this becomes the income of all workers (the average real wage rate w
times the number of workers L) plus the income of all capitalists (the rate of profit
r times the real value of the capital stock K). Remember that this equation is defini-
tionally true for any conceivable value of w, L, r, and K.
Anwar Shaikh (1974) resolved Fisher’s paradox by showing that through alge-
braic manipulation, the national accounts identity could be rewritten into a form that
is identical to a Cobb-Douglas production function (Eq. 1.7). All that was needed
was the assumption that both factor shares and the growth rates of wages and profits
remained constant.
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Y = ALβK1−β (1.7)
Here, β is labor’s share (Eq. 1.8) while A is a smooth exponential growth function
(Eq. 1.9) whose parameter ψ is the weighted average of the growth rates of the wage
and profit rates (Eq. 1.10). For an explanation of the steps involved in this algebraic
transformation, see Shaikh (1974) and/or Felipe and Holtz (2001).
β = wL/Y (1.8)
A = A0eψt (1.9)
ψ = β wˆ+(1−β )rˆ (1.10)
Note that equations 1.7 through 1.10 contain nothing that does not follow di-
rectly from the national accounts identity: they are definitionally true. To empha-
size this point, Shaikh showed that even a production relation that traced the word
‘HUMBUG’ (with capita per head on the horizontal axis and output per head on the
vertical axis) could be successfully fitted with a Cobb-Douglas production function
using the method provided by Solow 1957.
The key assumption used to derive equations 1.7 through 1.10 was that both fac-
tor shares and the growth rates of wages and profits remain constant. If this holds
approximately true in the real world (and it often does), production function esti-
mates will uncover the underlying identity. Based on Shaikh’s results, McCombie
concludes:
... [T]he underlying accounting identity ... prevents the empirical testing of the
production function. Thus, it invalidates the traditional defense of the use of the
production function, which is that, in spite of all the reservations about its un-
derlying theoretical rationale, ... it is still legitimate to use production functions
because of their good predictive ability. (McCombie (2001), p. 613)
Edwin Burmeister, noting his discontent with aggregate production functions, makes
the following suggestion:
Perhaps for the purpose of answering many macroeconomic questions ... we
should disregard the concept of a production function at the macroeconomic
level. The economist who succeeds in finding a suitable replacement will be a
prime candidate for a future Nobel prize (Burmeister, 2008, pp. 4278, cited in
Felipe and Fisher 2003, p. 247)
I take the functional form critique seriously. As such, I do not use production
functions in this book.
The Measurement Critique
The ‘measurement critique’ highlights epistemological difficulties surrounding the
measurement of production function inputs and outputs. The starting point for neo-
classical growth theory is to assume an economy in which both capital input and
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final output consist of a single, unchanging commodity. In formulating his model,
Solow writes: “There is only one commodity, output as a whole, whose rate of pro-
duction is designated Y (t). Thus we can speak unambiguously of the community’s
real income” ((1956) p. 66).
In such a model, inputs and outputs are well-defined. Both capital and output
consist of the same single good. However, in the real world, there is a myriad of
different commodities that change over time. The question is, when moving from
a single-commodity model to the real world, can we still “speak unambiguously”
of inputs and outputs? This question was at the heart of what became known as the
‘Cambridge Capital Controversy’, a debate between Cambridge (UK) economists
Joan Robinson and Pierro Sraffa, and Cambridge (US) economists such as Paul
Samuelson and Robert Solow.
Joan Robinson (1953) set off the debate by asking a very simple question: in what
unit is ‘capital’ to be measured? Nitzan and Bichler (2009) note that in neoclassical
theory, capital exists as a duality, having both a physical and financial magnitude.
While only the financial magnitude can be measured, it is hoped (by neoclassical
economists) that the financial magnitude will, over the long-run, somehow reflect
the underlying ‘physical’ quantity of capital.
However, by measuring capital in terms of its monetary value, many problems
arise. Cohen and Harcourt summarize one aspect of the problem:
Heterogeneous capital goods cannot be measured and aggregated in physical
units; instead, capital valuation must be used, as Wicksell (1911) told us long
ago. Their value can be measured either as the cost of production, which takes
time, or the present value of the future output stream they produce. In either
case, since the measure involves time, it presumes a rate of interest which, in
the simple model, is determined in a one-way manner by the quantity of capital.
This additional circularity, or interdependence, causes Wicksell effects. Wicksell
effects involve changes in the value of the capital stock associated with different
interest rates, arising from either inventory revaluations of the same physical
stock due to new capital goods prices (price Wicksell effects) or differences in
the physical stock of capital goods (real Wicksell effects). (2003, pp. 201-202)
[emphasis added]
Charles Hulten concludes that “the methods used for imputing the price and
quantity of capital input are strongly neoclassical” (2009, p. 49). This raises impor-
tant epistemological issues for those seeking to test neoclassical theory. A cardinal
rule for the non-biased test of a theory is that one cannot use metrics that themselves
are influenced by the theory that one is testing. If, as Hulten states, the measurement
of capital is “strongly neoclassical”, then the use of such a metric in a test of neo-
classical theory poses significant epistemological issues.
While the Cambridge controversy revolved around problems with the aggrega-
tion of capital, Felipe and Fisher note that “there exist equally important labor and
output aggregation problems” (2003, p. 228). Here I focus on problems with aggre-
gating output. Just like capital, output must be measured in monetary rather than
physical terms. This measurement is conceptually very simple: nominal GDP is de-
flated by a price index that captures the change in the average price level.
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However, as discussed extensively in Chapter 2, this process is not as straight-
forward as it sounds. One key problem involves changes in relative prices. Francis
Edgeworth (1887) notes that:
If one great group of commodities varies pretty uniformly in one direction, and
another in a different direction (or even in the same direction but in a markedly
different degree), then the task of restoring the level of prices can no longer
be regarded as a purely objective ... (cited in Vining and Elwertowski, 1976, p.
699)[emphasis added]
Landefeld and Parker (1997) explain aspects of the problem:
... because relative prices and associated patterns of purchases change over
time, ... GDP growth will be quite sensitive to the choice of the base year, and a
shift in the base year often has a significant impact on the measured growth rates.
... In periods such as the energy crisis of 1973-75, relative price and con-
sumption patterns can change rapidly, and significant bias can creep into fixed-
weighted measures even during periods close to the base period.
If, as Edgeworth argues, there are irreducibly subjective elements to the calcu-
lation of price indices, and thus, to the calculation of real GDP, we must take such
claims seriously, for they have a direct impact on the quality of empirical research.
This subjectivity means that if different methodological choices are adopted, the
resulting output metric might be different. Giampietro et al. call this the “epistemo-
logical predicament associated with purposive quantitative analysis ... the observer
always affects what is observed when defining the descriptive domain” (2006, p.
307). As shown in section 2.3, different methodologies for calculating inflation can
lead to wildly different estimations of real GDP.
A further problem with real GDP is that, like capital, it is not clear that its cal-
culation is sufficiently independent from neoclassical theory to allow a non-biased
test of such theory. Jonathan Nitzan writes:
In a certain fundamental sense ... our data on how prices and output change may
not be sufficiently independent from our views on why they change and [this]
inherent subjectivity must be recognized. Within the present historical epoch, the
predisposition of price and quantity data toward the neoclassical economic out-
look means that these data may not be altogether suitable to test the neoclassical
outlook against competing frameworks. (1992, p. 158)
I take the measurement critique very seriously, especially the possibility that the
conventional measure of output (real GDP) is circularly dependent on neoclassical
theory. As such, I adopt an empirical methodology that does not rely on real GDP.
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An Unorthodox Approach
My objective in this book is to test the assumptions made by neoclassical growth
theory in a way that is completely independent of neoclassical theory itself. In order
to maintain this independence, I make the following radical methodological deci-
sions: 1) I abandon the use of production functions; and 2) I abandon the use of real
GDP.
This second decision is particularly unorthodox. After all, real GDP is the growth
metric used by economists. My decision to abandon real GDP is based on the con-
tributions of Nitzan and Bichler (2009) to capital theory. Nitzan and Bichler critique
the ‘real/nominal’ duality that underpins many aspects of economics. This duality
assumes that monetary value (the ‘nominal’ sphere) somehow represents an under-
lying physical magnitude (the ‘real’ sphere).
Thus, in capital theory, the value of financial capital is assumed to represent the
scale of the physical capital stock. Similarly, in growth theory, it is assumed that
the value of output (‘nominal’ GDP) can be transformed into the quantity of output
(‘real’ GDP). Yet, Nitzan and Bichler argue that there are insurmountable epistemo-
logical problems with this duality. Their contribution to capital theory is to reject the
real/nominal duality by insisting that capital is a purely financial magnitude. In this
book, I take Nitzan and Bichler’s capital theory insights and apply them to growth
theory. Thus, I retain the use of nominal GDP (a purely financial magnitude), but
abandon the use of real GDP.
But one might ask – is it even possible to conduct empirical research about
growth without using real GDP? I argue that, not only is it possible, it is highly
desirable (from a biophysical perspective). I assert that a biophysical growth theory
should be concerned with biophysical scale, not monetary scale.
Before discussing my chosen measure of biophysical scale, let us take a step
back and consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that one day humans
encounter an alien race with advanced technology. However, this technology (and
other aspects of their economy) are very different than anything with which we are
familiar. Given this situation, how would we measure the ‘scale’ of their economy
in order to compare it to our own? Because we do not understand their economy,
we cannot speak of ‘output’ in any meaningful sense. However, since the laws of
physics and chemistry presumably apply the same to these aliens as they do to us,
we could quite easily measure the raw material throughput of their economy. If we
insist on a biophysical measure of scale, then there are really only two ways to
measure this material flow – in terms of mass or in terms of energy. Both will yield
different results for the ‘scale’ of the economy.
Biophysical scholars have recently begun to measure economies in biophysical
terms. For instance Gierlinger and Krausmann (2012) measure the historical scale
of the United States in terms of mass flows. As such, I could use mass flow as my
measure of biophysical scale (however, Gierlinger and Krausmann have not, to my
knowledge, made their data public). Giampetro et al. (2012) explore the properties
of an indicator they call ‘bio-economic pressure’ – the total energy consumption of
a society divided by the human activity in the industrial (and agricultural) sector.
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In the spirit of this exploration, I make the decision to adopt energy throughput as
a biophysical measure of scale. When relevant data is available, I use Ayres and
Warr’s (2005) estimates of useful work.
In order to avoid confusion, I should be clear that this does not mean that I am
using energy use as a ‘proxy’ for output. Energy is an input to the economy. I adopt
it as a measure of biophysical scale because it is a particularly important input, but I
make no claim that energy has a monopoly on measurements of scale. Nor do I claim
that energy is a ‘better’ measure of scale than is real GDP – it is simply different.
Furthermore, I do not claim that energy use and real GDP are equivalent. Such a
claim would make my work redundant: if the two were the same, then there would
be no reason for adopting energy as a measure of scale. The whole point of my
approach is to use a metric of biophysical scale that departs significantly from the
orthodox output metric of real GDP. By doing so, one opens the door for empirical
results that would not otherwise be possible if only real GDP were used for analysis.
When testing neoclassical growth theory, I am forced to adopt a slight of hand.
Since the theory is explicit that ‘economic growth’ means the growth of the ‘quan-
tity of output’, my approach is to transform neoclassical assumptions about ‘output’
into assumptions regarding ‘biophysical scale’. One may protest that such slight of
hand is unjustified. However, the reality is that neoclassical growth theory cannot
be tested on its own terms. The neoclassical growth model is explicitly derived from
the assumption of a one-commodity economy in which output is defined in phys-
ical terms. However, the heterogeneity of actual output means that such physical
measurement is impossible.
Thus, neoclassical economists also adopt a slight of hand when testing their the-
ory. When applying their model to the real world, economists drop the pretence that
output can be measured in physical terms. Instead, the physical output term Y is
quietly replaced with an index of output measured in terms of monetary value (thus
assuming the validity of the real/nominal duality). As I find this neoclassical slight
of hand untenable, I choose to substitute my own. I believe that the need for a new
growth theory is so great that this highly unorthodox methodology is justified.
The approach adopted in this book requires a leap of faith on the part of the reader
who is trained in conventional economics. If one is not prepared to make such a leap,
then read no further. However, if one is interested in what happens when implicit
neoclassical assumptions are tested in a highly unorthodox manner, then continue
reading. Due to the ground-breaking nature of this approach, all results should be
considered preliminary. For the reader who is willing to make a leap of faith, I ask
only that one judge my approach on the robustness of the empirical evidence.
1.4 Goals and Book Layout
The goal of this book is twofold: 1) to contribute to the creation of a new biophysical
growth theory by pointing out some of the major problems of conventional (neoclas-
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sical) growth theory; and 2) to outline empirical components that I believe should
form part of the basis for a biophysical growth theory.
In the following chapters, each of the four implicit neoclassical assumptions in
Table 1.2 is tested empirically. Chapter 2 focuses on decoupling, Chapter 3 on dis-
tribution, Chapter 4 on institutional size, and Chapter 5 on labor structure. In all four
empirical studies, the evidence demonstrates that neoclassical growth theory makes
assumptions that exclude from analysis some of the most fundamental aspects of the
growth process. In an attempt to crystallize the important elements of a future bio-
physical growth theory, Chapter 6 concludes by formulating a set of stylized facts
that such a theory must successfully explain.
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Chapter 2
Decoupling
If it is very easy to substitute other factors for natural resources, then
there is in principle no “problem”. The world can, in effect, get along
without natural resources.
– Robert Solow (1974, p. 11)
Robert Solow’s above statement was part of a wider response from neoclassical
economists to the release of Donella and Dennis Meadow’s The Limits to Growth
(1972). According to simulations created by Meadows and colleagues, indefinite
future growth was unlikely, if not impossible. Rather, their model showed robust
tendencies towards inevitable collapse (from both resource depletion and pollution
accumulation). The Limits report, coupled with the onset of the 1973 oil crisis, led
to heightened concern over resource depletion. Neoclassical economists, in turn,
responded by insisting that input substitution, along with continued technological
progress, would ensure that growth could continue indefinitely.
This indefinite growth argument rests on the assumption that economic output
can become decoupled from resource inputs. Over the 40 years since the Limits
debate began, resource decoupling has become a major policy objective of many
governments and international agencies. For instance, the European Union insists
that “breaking the linkages between economic growth and resource use” should be
a key policy objective (CEC, 2002). The OECD has placed similar emphasis on
decoupling, stating that decoupling indicators are “valuable tools for determining
whether countries are on track towards sustainable development” ( 2003, p. 13).
This chapter investigates the empirical evidence for decoupling. While the trends
in the energy intensity of US real GDP seem to support the neoclassical decoupling
assumption, further investigation reveals that this issue is mired by fundamental
epistemological difficulties. I argue that both the evidence for and the concept of
decoupling are artifacts. I attempt to demonstrate that the evidence for decoupling
is a methodological artifact that results from the use of monetary value to mea-
sure the quantity of output. Furthermore, I argue that the very notion of ‘economic
output’ – and hence the notion of ‘decoupling’ – is a conceptual artifact that re-
sults from the misapplication of linear thinking onto a complex, non-linear system.
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I offer the alternative hypothesis that monetary value, rather than representing the
quantity of output, functions as a feedback mechanism that controls the flow of en-
ergy through the economy. I provide evidence that supports this hypothesis, and
discuss the implications of this paradigm shift for a biophysical growth theory.
2.1 Natural Resources in Neoclassical Growth Theory
David Stern observes that “there is an inbuilt bias in mainstream production and
growth theory to down-play the role of resources in the economy” (2004, p. 38).
The reader may have noticed, from Chapter 1, that natural resources are completely
absent from the Solow-Swan model, including its production function. Herman Daly
(as previously stated) notes that “since the production function is often explained as
a technical recipe, we might say that Solow’s recipe calls for making a cake with
only the cook and his kitchen” (1997, p, 261). Joseph Stiglitz (1974) rectifies this
shortcoming by introducing a modified production function with natural resources
R:
Y = ALβKαRλ (2.1)
Before proceeding to the implications of this modified production function, it
is worth discussing why, in practice, it is almost never used. Neoclassical growth
theory is embedded in a larger neoclassical framework in which factor incomes are
assumed to be proportional to each factor’s marginal productivity. The result is that
the exponents in the production function represent both a factor’s share of national
income and its relative importance to overall production.
This condition automatically discounts the importance of natural resources, since
the income of natural resource owners (λ ) represents an exceedingly small portion
of total income. For instance, the value of total primary fossil fuel consumption
constituted an average of only 3% of US GDP over the last 60 years, meaning that
when adding energy to a neoclassical production function, the energy input must be
raised to the exponent 0.03, rendering it almost inconsequential.1 Thus, maintaining
compatibility with neoclassical distribution theory guarantees that resources will
remain theoretically unimportant in neoclassical growth theory.
For the moment, however, we leave this difficulty behind and focus on Stiglitz’s
modified production function (Eq. 2.1). This model presents two possible methods
for decoupling output (Y ) from resource input (R): either labor (L) and capital (K)
inputs may be substituted for natural resources, or technological progress (A) may
shift the entire production function, allowing more output per unit of input. Since
there are no inherent limits (in neoclassical theory) to either substitution or techno-
logical progress, there are no inherent limits to resource decoupling. This constitutes
the following implicit assumption:
1 Value of fossil fuel production from EIA, Annual Energy Review, Table 3.2 . Value of fossil fuel
imports from ibid, Table 3.7. Nominal GDP from BEA Table 1.1.5.
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Decoupling Assumption:
The quantity of economic output can become decoupled from energy inputs.
2.2 Measuring Decoupling
In order to test the decoupling assumption, we must first calculate output Y . Recall
that output, in the Solow-Swan model, is conceived as a single commodity. In the
real world, many different commodities are produced, meaning some sort of aggre-
gation is necessary. This requires that we add together the quantity (Q) of all the
commodities that are produced. Using summation notation, this becomes:
Y = Q1 +Q2 +Q3 + ...=∑Qi (2.2)
However, this sum is meaningless without some common unit of measure. Economists
typically choose unit-price (P) for such measurement purposes. Thus, the quantity
of production is now measured in terms of total value (Yn), which is calculated us-
ing the quantity-price product of each individual commodity and summed across the
spectrum of all commodities:
Yn = Q1P1 +Q2P2 + ...=∑Qi×Pi (2.3)
Equation 2.3 is the formula for nominal GDP. A problem, however, is that a change
in output can arise from both a change in quantity Q or a change in unit-price P.
Since we are only interested in the former, we must adjust for pure price change
(i.e. inflation) by dividing nominal GDP by some index of the average price of all
commodities (P¯). This gives us equation 2.4 – the general formula for real GDP:
Yr =
1
P¯∑Qi×Pi (2.4)
Real GDP has come to be the output metric used by economists. Decoupling,
which is defined as an increase in output per unit of natural resource input, is typi-
cally measured in terms of the ratio of resource input R, to real GDP output Yr:
Resource Intensity of GDP =
R
Yr
(2.5)
Since we are only concerned with energy decoupling, we replace the generalized
resource term R with the more specific primary energy consumption term E, giving
us the primary energy intensity of GDP:
Primary Energy Intensity of GDP =
E
Yr
(2.6)
Figure 2.1 shows how this metric has changed over the last two centuries of US
history. While data prior to 1900 should be regarded as a rough estimate, there is
clearly a long-term downward trend. It would seem, then, that decoupling is a very
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reasonable assumption, and we have no reason to suspect that it will not continue
into the indefinite future.
Typical investigations of decoupling go no further than this; however there are
a few complicating factors that should be investigated. The first concerns how (or
‘where’) we measure energy consumption. Figure 2.2 shows an example of this
issue by tracing the path of energy used by a car. Energy enters the system as a
primary energy resource (crude oil). This is then transformed into gasoline, then
thermal energy in the car engine, and then finally the kinetic energy of the car. At
each stage of the process, energy is wasted, meaning very little of the primary energy
is transformed into useful work.
We can relate primary energy inputs (E) to useful work output (U) by means of
the efficiency (η) of the energy conversion process:
U = ηE (2.7)
A major difficulty arises when we move from a single process to the economy as a
whole. How do we account for the efficiency of the myriad of different conversion
processes that occur? Giampietro et al. (2013) argue that measuring useful work at
the level of the entire economy is impossible. Ayres & Warr (2009), on the other
hand, argue that useful work can be estimated by means of a conceptual simplifi-
cation. Ayres & Warr group end-use energy into the following five categories: elec-
tricity, heat (low, mid, high), mechanical drive, light, and muscle work. They then
calculate the average efficiency of the processes within each category, and then ag-
gregate the results to get an estimate for the useful work done by the entire economy.
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Using Ayres & Warr’s data, we can conceive of an alternative decoupling index
which now uses useful work (U) instead of primary energy:
Useful Work Intensity of GDP =
U
Yr
(2.8)
The time-series for the useful work intensity of real GDP (Fig. 2.3) looks nothing
like the primary energy time-series (Fig. 2.1). While there is significant change in
the useful work intensity of GDP, there is little evidence of long-term decoupling.
This important result indicates that the majority of historical primary energy decou-
pling has been the result of efficiency increases in energy conversion processes.
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This increase in efficiency is what neoclassical economists would call embodied
technological progress, as opposed to the disembodied form (A) used in the Solow-
Swan model (Sakellaris and Wilson, 2004). Most importantly, this embodied form
of technological progress has inherent limits stipulated by the laws of thermody-
namics. While 100% efficiency is the ultimate limit (forbidden by the second law
of thermodynamics), the maximum theoretical efficiency for many energy conver-
sion processes (such as heat engines) is much less. For instance the Carnot Limit
for the internal combustion engine is a mere 37%, with current car engines having
efficiencies of about 20 percent (Chandler, 2010). Thus a future doubling of engine
efficiency is out of the question.
It appears that primary energy decoupling has mainly been the result of increases
in energy conversion efficiency. Since there are strict limits on the efficiency of
such conversion (for example, coal conversion to electricity appears to be nearly
unchanged at 40 percent for decades), we must concede that decoupling cannot
continue indefinitely.
2.3 Problems With Real GDP
Before we continue with the investigation of decoupling, it is important to discuss
some of the difficulties with using monetary value to estimate an index of output.
There are three basic problems:
1. Changes in relative prices mean that the basic unit of measure (price) is
not well defined.
2. Measures of quality change contain inherently subjective elements. More-
over, current quality change methodology may be circularly dependent on
neoclassical theory.
3. In an economy dominated by services, it is not clear that an ‘output’ can
be objectively defined.
We begin with the problem of changes in relative price. The transmutation from
the value of output (nominal GDP) to the quantity of output (real GDP) relies on the
existence of an index capable of accurately and objectively quantifying the average
change in prices. But unless price changes are completely homogeneous, the actual
calculation of such an index is intrinsically subjective.
One might think that an average price is unambiguous. One simply adds the
prices of all commodities together and divides by the number of commodities. But
this is an unweighted average. If we were to compute the average price this way,
we effectively state that the change in price of a single unique commodity (i.e. a
rare piece of art) is as important as the same change in price of a billion uniform
commodities (i.e. pencils). What we want is a weighted average that reflects the fact
that some prices are more important than others. But herein lies the crux: there are
numerous ways that such an average might be weighted.
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In order to demonstrate this issue, we must return to the theoretical underpin-
nings of real GDP. Equation 2.4 showed (in abstract form) the methodology used
to calculate real GDP. To make things more concrete, let us apply this formula to
a simple economy with two commodities (A & B). Real output (Yr) becomes the
quantity-price product of these two commodities, divided by an index of their aver-
age price:
Yr =
QAPA +QBPB
P¯
(2.9)
Table 2.1 shows sample calculations for output (Yr), using imagined numbers.
Here we use an explicit average price, calculated by weighting the price of a com-
modity by its respective quantity in the first year. Notice that we have a change in
the quantity of commodity A only between year 1 and 2. During all other years, the
quantity of each commodity remains unchanged. Additionally, price change is ho-
mogeneous for the first three years: all prices double annually. However, in year 4
we introduce a divergent price change: the price of A doubles while the price of B is
halved. The effect of this divergent price change is to create an increase in the mea-
sure of output without any underlying change in the quantities of either commodity.
Alternatively, we can calculate the average price implicitly (which is how it is
most often calculated). To do this, we first calculate the nominal value of output,
and then divide this by the value of output with constant prices. But, in order to do
this, we must choose a base year from which to hold prices constant. For instance,
the formula for the average price with a year 1 base would be:
P¯yr1 =
QAPA +QBPB
QA($20)+QB($10)
(2.10)
The decision about which base year to use is completely subjective, yet it is non-
trivial. It can have major effects on our measure of output. For instance, the results
for both a year 1 base (Y r1) and a year 4 base (Y r4) are shown in Table 2.2. While
the erroneous output change between year 3 and year 4 has been corrected, we now
Year Quantity A Quantity B Price A Price B Price Index Output
1 100 500 $20 $10 1.0 $7, 000
2 200 500 $40 $20 2.0 $9, 000
3 200 500 $80 $40 4.0 $9, 000
4 200 500 $160 $20 3.7 $11, 308
Table 2.1 Output Using Explicit Average Price
Year Nominal Value Price Index (Y r1) Price Index (Y r4) Output (Y r1) Output (Y r4)
1 $7, 000 1.0 1.0 $7, 000 $7, 000
2 $18, 000 2.0 1.6 $9, 000 $11, 340
3 $36, 000 4.0 3.2 $9, 000 $11, 340
4 $42, 000 4.7 3.7 $9, 000 $11, 340
Table 2.2 Output Using Implicit Average Price
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have a time-series discrepancy associated with the use of different base years. There
are no objective grounds for deciding which series is correct. Our measure of output
is simply ambiguous.
As demonstrated by these examples, an average price (and any measure of output
derived from it) is uniquely defined only when price-change is homogeneous. In the
case where the relative price-change between commodities is heterogeneous, any
calculation of the average price will be but one of many that are possible. Addition-
ally, the degree to which such calculations may diverge is a function of the degree
to which relative prices diverge.
The way to understand this phenomenon is to realize that prices constitute our
basic unit of measurement. By definition, the most important attribute of a unit is
its uniformity. When prices change uniformly over time there is no problem – we
simply dilate (or compress) our unit accordingly. However, if price change is not
uniform for all commodities, we have a fundamental problem: our unit is no longer
well-defined. In principle, there is no way to escape this dilemma. Without a well-
defined unit, objective measurement is impossible. In such a case, many different
values of real GDP can be defined, each backed by a different method of calculating
the average price. At most, one can subjectively argue for the value of real GDP that
is ‘best’. However, this subjectivity means that we are no longer measuring what
output is, but rather, what we think it should be.
Thus, it is important to investigate price change in the real world. If price change
is relatively homogeneous, the preceding theoretical hurdle can be dismissed as
unimportant. On the other hand, if price change is divergent, then we must seri-
ously question the objectivity of real GDP. Figure 2.4 shows historical US price
changes for a select group of Consumer Price Index (CPI) commodities. Although
this is by no means a representative sample, it does serve to illustrate the enormous
degree to which actual prices have diverged over the 20th century.
To give a sense of the scale of this divergence and to quantify the ambiguity in
our unit, we can calculate the relative standard deviation of these prices.2 Initially
zero in 1935 (the base year), by 2010, the relative standard deviation in the prices of
these 10 commodities was 91%. This indicates that over the course of 75 years, the
normal divergence from the average price was almost as large as the average itself.
It is important to remember that this is not a measurement error – the result of the
imprecision of a measuring device. In order to state such an error, one must have a
stable unit. For instance, we can state that a thermometer measures the temperature
as 20.2◦C with a measurement error of ±0.5◦C. But notice that the error estimate is
expressed in the same units as the measurement itself. Thus, to even state this error
requires that we agree on the definition of our basic unit (the degree Celsius is pre-
cisely defined as 1/100th of the temperature range between the freezing and boiling
point of water at sea level). Unlike measurement error, what Figure 2.4 shows is a
fundamental and irreducible uncertainty in our basic unit.
This can be put in perspective by comparing the problem to units of length. His-
torically, people measured small lengths in units of body parts (i.e. actual ‘feet’ and
2 Relative standard deviation is defined as the standard deviation divided by the data mean and
multiplied by 100%.
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’hands’). Imagine a similar unit called the ‘man’, defined simply as the height of the
man doing the measuring. This unit is not very well defined, since height varies con-
siderably among men. However, in contrast to the 91% deviation in relative prices
calculated above, the relative standard deviation in the height of adult males is only
about 4% (Smith et al, 2000). This indicates that, as inaccurate as a unit of length
called a ‘man’ would be, it is still 20 times more accurate than the unit on which real
GDP is based. One is tempted to imagine how many bridges would remain standing
if engineers based their calculations on such a poorly defined unit.
Since the choice of base year effectively ‘defines’ the unit of measure, rebasing
(changing the base year) can lead to spectacular changes in real GDP. For instance,
Nigeria recently changed from a 1990 to a 2010 base year. The result was that its
GDP nearly doubled (Blas and Wallis, 2014). A similar doubling of Ghana’s GDP
occurred in 2010 when it changed its base year from 1993 to 2006. Base year revi-
sions in Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia have also led to large changes in
GDP (Jerven, 2012, 2014).
In response to this difficulty, the US Bureau of Economic Analysis has changed
how it calculates real GDP. It has moved from the base year method to a ‘chain-
weighted’ approach that uses an average of multiple, moving base years (Stein-
del, 1995). The hope is that this will ‘correct’ for errors introduced by divergent
prices. My contention, however, is that this misses the point. From an epistemologi-
cal standpoint, the validity of a unit of measurement hinges on it being well-defined
over time and space. Since prices (our basic unit) change in non-uniform ways, they
26 2 Decoupling
fail this basic condition. The chain-weighting approach attempts to ‘solve’ a prob-
lem that is unsolvable.
The BEA makes the claim that a chain-weighted average price is ‘better’ than
a non-chain-weighted one. However, such a claim is untestable: because we are
dealing with the ambiguity of the basic unit, there are no objective criteria on which
to determine what is ‘better’ or ’worse’. The only objective way to determine if a
scientific measurement is ‘better’ is if it is more accurate (i.e. has smaller error). But
as discussed above, to determine such an error paradoxically requires a well-defined
unit of measurement. The basic instability in the unit of price cannot be altered by
our methodological choice of how to compute the average price; instead it is an
inalterable function of history.
A further problem, when moving from neoclassical theory to the real world, is
that the former posits a single, unchanging commodity. In reality, the qualities of
a commodity can change immensely with time (think of the difference between a
1980s computer and a modern laptop). In price index methodology, a quality change
is taken to be the same thing as a quantity change. Jonathan Nitzan explains:
[S]uppose Ford Motors produced 100,000 Mustang cars at a unit price of $10,000
in 1975 and manufactured 150,000 units at a price of 14,000 per car in 1985. If
we can presume that the Mustang of 1975 was identical to the one produced in
1985, we can, without ever defining what a Mustang is, conclude that there was a
50 percent increase in quantity and a 40 percent rise in price. On the other hand,
if we acknowledge that the two models are different, such a direct comparison
has little meaning and we must now both define the ‘commodity’ and describe
how it changes over time.
The two Mustang models may vary in aspects of production – such as the
technology with which they were manufactured, the labour involved in their as-
sembly, and their material composition. They could also vary in their so-called
‘consumption attributes’ – such as weight, size, power, shape, speed, comfort,
colour, fuel efficiency, noise and chemical pollution. Under such circumstances,
we must somehow denominate all such ‘quality’ differences in universal, quanti-
tative terms and adjust our computations accordingly.
For instance, if because of such changes, a 1985 model contained twice as
much ‘automobile quality’ as the 1975 model, we would have a 200 percent rise
in quantity produced and a 30 percent decrease – not increase – in unit price! On
the other hand, if quality was found to be 50 percent lower in the 1985 model
than in the 1975 one, we would end up with a 180 percent rise in price and a 25
percent reduction in quantity! (1992, p. 156)
Thus, the objective quantification of output hinges on the objective quantification
of qualitative change. Note that the scale of such adjustments is not trivial. For
instance, Figure 2.4 shows massive deflation in the price of computers. While actual
unit prices have declined slightly over the last 30 years, the majority of this deflation
is a result of the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s quality change adjustment. The BLS
looks at variety of computer attributes (processor speed, hard drive capacity, ram,
operating system, etc.) and attempts to measure how these attributes have improved
over time. It then combines the changes in each attribute (which involves deciding
the relative importance of each attribute) to arrive at an index for the overall change
in ‘quality’ of the computer. This ‘quality’ then has an inverse effect on the price
index: if the ‘quality’ of a computer doubles, the price index is halved.
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While quality adjustment is an essential element in the construction of a price
index, there are numerous conceptual difficulties associated with such adjustments
(UN, 1977; Nitzan, 1992). For instance, in order to quantify the changing nature
of a commodity, one must first subdivide the commodity into relevant ‘attributes’.
But how do we objectively decide those attributes that are relevant and those that
are irrelevant? Furthermore, once we have reduced a commodity to its constituent
attributes, how do we decide their relative importance? The most popular method is
called ‘hedonic quality adjustment’. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010) summa-
rizes the process as follows:
In price index methodology, hedonic quality adjustment has come to mean the
practice of decomposing an item into its constituent characteristics, obtaining
estimates of the value of the utility derived from each characteristic, and using
those value estimates to adjust prices when the quality of a good changes.
(emphasis added)
All quantitative comparisons require a unit of measurement. Here we see that the
Bureau of Labor Statistics is attempting to measure the attributes of a commodity
in units of utility. This is problematic for two reasons. First, utility is a hypothetical
psychic flux that cannot be directly measured, making it unsuitable as a basic unit.
Because utility cannot be observed, Nitzan (1992) argues that hedonic quality mea-
surements are unfalsifiable. Secondly, utility is a fundamental tenet of neoclassical
theory. By locating ‘quality’ in a commodity’s ability to give utility, statistical agen-
cies are explicitly adopting a neoclassical theory of value (i.e. that value comes from
utility). Nitzan writes: “Both the idea that quality can be measured (objectively or
not) and the methods developed for that purpose are closely tied with the neoclas-
sical paradigm. The evidence supporting these conclusions seems overwhelming”
(1992, p.175-76).
This possible circularity between neoclassical theory and the estimation of real
GDP represents a fundamental problem for the empirical researcher. It is a cardi-
nal sin to test a theory using data that is circularly dependent on the theory being
tested. As such, if we want to conduct a truly independent test of neoclassical growth
theory, we may need to look for alternative metrics. Furthermore, we should not dis-
count the fact that the national accounts are created by and for governments. Since
governments are under immense pressure to show that the economy is growing, we
should not be so naive as to treat official real GDP estimates as a ‘disinterested’
measurement.
The last problem with real GDP is that while the notion of a ‘quantity of out-
put’ is intuitive when applied to the production of goods, it becomes less intuitive
(even nonsensical) when applied to certain services. For instance, how do we objec-
tively define the output quantity of education, healthcare, the performing arts, or of
finance? Imagine an economy that initially consists of only farmers, but gradually
changes its composition to consist of only financiers. In dollar terms, the economy
will grow, because financiers earn more money than farmers (in economic jargon,
they ‘add more value’). Yet in physical terms, the economy will shrink, because
financiers do not produce anything tangible.
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The enormous structural shift towards services means that this thought experi-
ment is now playing out in reality: services have been a major source of US GDP
growth in the last few decades, yet they have no clear physical dimension. Statisti-
cians avoid the problem of measuring service ‘output’ by simply defining the output
of such services as equivalent to their market value, and then deflating this value us-
ing a price index from another sector that is more amenable to measurement (Sher-
wood, 1994; Griliches, 1992). Putting aside all of the measurement problems dis-
cussed above, the fact that the majority of people in the US are now employed in
services means that the very notion of a ‘quantity of output’ is becoming increas-
ingly fuzzy. If we cannot objectively define what output is, we cannot objectively
measure it.
At this point, if one accepts my argument that the estimation of real GDP is in-
herently subjective, one might still object that the scale of the problem is not that
large. Indeed, when stated only in theoretical form, it is difficult to grasp the degree
to which different estimates of real GDP might diverge (when different method-
ological choices are used). This difficulty can be remedied by contrasting official
and unofficial estimates of real GDP. Figure 2.5 plots the official real GDP esti-
mate against estimates from John Williams’ Shadow Government Statistics website
and a ‘vintage’ estimate using a 1995 base year (curiously the year that the BEA
abandoned the fixed base year method). The discrepancy between upper and lower
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estimates is a whopping 250%. Again, it must be stressed that there are no objective
criteria to choose between these three estimates.
The basic theoretical edifice of ‘decoupling’ rests upon both a well-defined re-
source input, and a well-defined output. My contention, however, is that the lack of
a stable unit makes it impossible to objectively define a quantity of output. This puts
the whole notion of decoupling into a measurement limbo.
2.4 Decoupling: Fact or Artifact?
For the remainder of the chapter, I investigate the hypothesis that the evidence for
decoupling is a methodological artifact that arises from the use of monetary value
to measure output. As demonstrated below, when the price of energy is used to
deflate nominal GDP (rather than the GDP deflator), evidence for decoupling al-
most entirely disappears. I hypothesize that monetary value, rather than represent
the quantity of output, functions as a feedback device for controlling the flow of
resources. Further investigation suggests that this feedback is not random; rather, it
is fundamentally related to the biophysical labor productivity of the mining sector.
To frame this discussion, we return to evidence for the decoupling of real GDP
from useful work. However, rather than look at the ratio of useful work to real GDP
(as we did in Fig. 2.3), we now look at the respective growth rates of each series
(i.e. we move from absolute units to percentage rate of change). Figure 2.6 plots
the historical growth rates of useful work and real GDP over the last century. When
plotted this way, evidence for decoupling will appear as a divergence in the growth
rates of the two series, with real GDP growing more quickly than useful work. Note
that for most of the period shown, the two series are very similar, meaning there
is little evidence of decoupling. However, after 1970, useful work and real GDP
growth rates diverge significantly, with real GDP continuing to grow at about 3% per
year, while useful work growth slows significantly. What is behind this decoupling?
Does it represent some new form of technological progress, some sort of capital
substitution, or the take-off of the ‘knowledge economy’?
Warr & Ayres (2012) attempt to explain this decoupling by looking at the growth
of information and communications technology capital. I pursue a different expla-
nation. Instead, I hypothesize that this divergence is an artifact of our measure of
output, real GDP. In order to test this hypothesis, we must first adopt a different
method for deflating nominal GDP. Recall that the transmutation from nominal to
real GDP (Yn ⇒ Yr) is accomplished by means of an average price index (P¯) that
adjusts for inflation:
Yr =
Yn
P¯
(2.11)
Nearly all of the theoretical difficulties associated with real GDP reside in the
construction of the average price index. A simple way around these problems is
to avoid the average price concept entirely, and instead deflate nominal GDP by
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the price of a single, unchanging commodity. By doing so, however, we are no
longer constructing a quantity measure of output; rather, we are constructing what
I call a specific purchasing power index (SPP) 3. The specific purchasing power of
commodity x is defined as nominal GDP divided by the price of x:
SPPx =
Yn
Px
(2.12)
The specific purchasing power of commodity x measures the ability of a nation
to finance the consumption of this commodity. It is a symbolic measure in the sense
that it denotes neither the amount of commodity x that is actually consumed nor the
amount that could conceivable be consumed.4 However, since the ability to finance
consumption is a prerequisite to actual consumption, this metric should be related
to biophysical flows.
In order to avoid the problem of measuring changes in quality, we want to choose
a commodity that remains uniform across time. Energy resources are almost com-
pletely unique in this regard. While primary energy sources come in many quali-
tatively different forms, the science of energetics allows us to compare all of them
3 I use the word specific to disambiguate from the more common notion of purchasing power,
which typically refers to the ability to consume a basket of goods or services, rather than a single
good.
4 While an individual could conceivably spend his entire income on a single commodity, it is
impossible (and absurd) for a nation to do so. For instance, if the United States spent its entire
nominal GDP on fossil fuel energy, its energy consumption would be greater than that for the
entire world, and no other goods or services would be generated.
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using a single, well-defined unit (the Joule). In this section, I use energy-specific
purchasing power to avoid average price problems.
We can use energy-specific purchasing power to see if the post-1970 decoupling
shown in Figure 2.6 is a methodological artifact. However, by abandoning real GDP
in favor of specific purchasing power, we are no longer investigating the decoupling
of output from resource input; rather, we are looking for evidence supporting the
following monetary feedback hypothesis:
Monetary Feedback Hypothesis:
Monetary value represents a feedback mechanisms for controlling re-
source flows. As such, the growth of energy inputs should be tightly
coupled to the economy’s ability to finance their consumption.
We can test this hypothesis by investigating changes in the specific purchasing
power of useful work (which is equal to nominal GDP deflated by an index of the
price of useful work). An immediate problem is that most forms of useful work
have no price. We usually pay for energy in its primary form; once it has been
transformed into an end-use application, we almost never pay directly for this work.
For instance, we purchase the gasoline used by a car, but never the end-use kinetic
energy of the car . The only Ayres-Warr category of useful work with a well-defined
market price is electricity. Deflating nominal GDP by the price of a kilowatt-hour
(kWh) of electricity gives kWh-specific purchasing power:
SPPkWh =
Yn
PkWh
(2.13)
My contention is that kWh-specific purchasing power represents a rough proxy
for the ability of the economy to purchase useful work. We are not used to thinking
in these terms, so a comparison to the household level is helpful. One’s household
income determines what one can consume. If we compare one’s income to the price
of a pencil, this gives an indication of how many pencils one could consume. By
extension, if we compare the value of the entire economy to the price of a pencil,
we get an indication of how many pencils the economy could consume. Likewise, by
comparing the value of the entire economy to the price of useful work (proxied by
the price of electricity) we get an indication of the economy’s ability to finance the
consumption of useful work. If the monetary feedback hypthesis is true, the growth
rate of kWh-specific purchasing power should be highly coupled to the growth rate
of useful work.
When we compare the historical growth rates of kWh-specific purchasing power
to those of useful work (Fig. 2.7), an interesting thing happens: the post-1970 decou-
pling of real GDP from useful work (shown in Fig. 2.6) almost entirely disappears.
Throughout the entire 20th century, the growth in the US economy’s ability to pur-
chase electricity remained tightly correlated with the growth of useful work. This
evidence is consistent with the monetary feedback hypothesis, and it supports the
hypothesis that the evidence for decoupling is a measurement artifact.
I should be clear that my argument is not that statistical agencies have somehow
made a ‘mistake’ in their calculation of output. To the contrary, I hypothesize that
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the notion of ‘output’ (and therefore, ‘decoupling’) is a conceptual artifact that re-
sults from the misapplication of linear thinking to a non-linear system. If we think
in biophysical terms, the economy is a complex, non-equilibrium system that uses
biophysical flows to sustain itself. The only linear output of such a system is its
waste.
This can be made more clear if we compare an economy to a living organism
(in this case, a frog). Both the frog and an economy function by exploiting a flow
of biophysical inputs and exuding a flow of biophysical waste outputs (Fig. 2.8).
This material flow sustains the internal processes of each system. While the frog
has many internal sub-systems/organs that might be said to produce an ‘output’ (i.e.
the heart has a blood flow output, the lungs an output of oxygen, and the endocrine
system an output of hormones), all such outputs are destined to become inputs to
other processes. Thus, the internal workings of an organism are intrinsically circular
– the frog (as a whole) has no ‘output’ other than its waste.
When we think in these terms, the economy, like the frog, has no output; rather,
it has a resource throughput. Our mistake comes when we label certain internal pro-
cesses as ‘output’: this gives the illusion of linearity where none actually exists. All
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of the outputs of the myriad of internal processes within the economy are destined
to become inputs to other processes. Thus the internal workings of the economy are
inherently circular, meaning the notion of a linear output is difficult to justify.
I argue that the notion of ‘output’ (at the level of the entire economy) is a con-
ceptual artifact that arises from the focus on monetary value. That is, we conflate a
sale (a monetized exchange) with the creation of an output. Note that a sale is in-
herently linear: money always flows from buyer to seller. Thus by aggregating sales
(and calling this output), we create the illusion that the economy is a linear process.
However, if we drop the assumption that a sale represents an output, the illusion of
linearity disappears: all internal processes become circular and the very notion of
output (and hence, decoupling) becomes untenable. At the level of the entire econ-
omy, the only linear flow is the stream of biophysical throughput, which ends in the
output of waste.
Rather than treat monetary value as an output, I offer the alternative hypothesis
that monetary value functions as a feedback device for controlling the flow of bio-
physical throughput (Meadows, 2012). We can frame this paradigm shift by asking
the following question: how does the economy ‘know’ to consume more resources?
In the animal kingdom, the stimulus to consume resources comes from sensory feed-
back: animals ‘know’ to consume resources because they ‘feel’ hungry. What is the
corollary of this sensory feedback in the economic system? My hypothesis is that
monetary value functions as such a feedback mechanism, stimulating or stifling the
flow of resources. Figure 2.9 shows a schematic of this process when applied to the
flow of useful work.
The exploitation of a resource does not intrinsically require monetary value.
However, if an economy becomes monetized (meaning certain human interactions
require the exchange of money), then resource exploitation is suddenly restricted by
the stock of money (since resources must be ‘paid for’). The pool of monetary value
by which we finance the consumption of resources is perpetually renewed by a pro-
cess that economists call ‘adding value’. For any given internal process, the sale of
the final product always has a greater value than the sum of the inputs. The sum of
all such added-value is equal to nominal GDP – the value of the entire economy.
As this pool of added value expands relative to the price of a resource, we feel
‘wealthier’. Resources are ‘cheap’ so we consume more of them. If the opposite
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is true – the value of the economy contracts relative to the price of a resource –
we feel ‘poorer’. Resources are ‘expensive’ so we consume fewer of them. Thus, I
argue that prices constitute a feedback system that regulates the flow of resources
through the economy. This feedback system functions so long as humans agree not
to consume resources unless they can be ‘paid for’ (i.e. we agree not to steal). The
long-term coupling between the growth rate of useful work and kWh-specific pur-
chasing power lends credence to this view.
By thinking in this way, however, we place a heavy emphasis on the price of
energy (the price of electricity in this case). Thus, we must ask – where does the
price of energy come from? It is rather disconcerting to think that random market
fluctuations might cause a change in the price of energy that somehow leads to a
change in the entire economy’s ability to consume useful work. This would lead us
straight back to the neoclassical view that the market is the ultimate arbiter of the
economy. The task of biophysical economics should be to show that energy prices
are, in fact, not random at all. Instead, they are a reflection of a broader biophysical
reality.
Interesting work on the topic of energy prices has been done by King and Hall
(2011), who link historical prices of oil and gas to energy return on investment
(EROI). Giampietro et al. (2012) stress that the biophysical labor productivity of the
energy sector is equally as important as EROI in indicating the quality of the energy
production process. Building on Giampietro et al., we can define the biophysical
labor productivity of the US mining sector (ρM) as the energy content of domestic
fossil fuel production (EFF ) divided by the number of workers in the mining sector
(LM):
ρM =
EFF
LM
(2.14)
As King and Hall have done with EROI, it seems quite reasonable to hypothesize
that the price of energy could be somehow linked to mining productivity. Before
proceeding, it is helpful to first reflect on what the price of a commodity really
means. Most economists would agree that the nominal price of a commodity is
meaningless, in and of itself. A price only gains meaning when placed in comparison
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to the price of other commodities. One way of making such a comparison is to relate
the price of a single commodity to the average price of all commodities. This gives
us the ‘real’ price of a commodity. However, as discussed in section 2.3, there are
numerous problems with average price indexes, so I avoid this approach. A different
(very unorthodox) way of contextualizing the price of a single commodity is to
compare it to the total value of all (new) commodities. Unlike the average price, the
total value of all new commodities (nominal GDP) is uniquely defined at a single
point in time (sampling errors aside).
Based on this unorthodox approach, we can contextualize the price of energy by
comparing it to the value of all new commodities – nominal GDP. Since we are
now concerned with the output of the mining sector (fossil fuels), we are interested
in the nominal price of one domestically produced Joule of fossil fuel energy (PJ).
We calculate this price by dividing the total value of fossil fuel production by the
energy content of this fuel. Using the notation developed previously, joule-specific
purchasing power is defined as the ratio of nominal GDP (Yn) to the average price
of one Joule of fossil fuel:
SPPJ =
Yn
PJ
(2.15)
Figure 2.10 plots joule-specific purchasing power against the biophysical labor
productivity of the mining sector. The two series show a striking degree of correla-
tion. Given this high correlation, it seems reasonable to write the following propor-
tionality statement:
SPPJ ∝ ρM (2.16)
Since what we are interested in is the price of fossil fuel, we use the definition of
joule-specific purchasing power (Eq.2.15) to arrive at equation 2.17:
Yn
PJ
∝ ρM (2.17)
By rearranging for fossil fuel price, we get equation 2.18:
PJ ∝
Yn
ρM
(2.18)
This indicates that the nominal price of fossil fuel is a simple function of two
variables: nominal GDP and the biophysical productivity of the mining sector. Fig-
ure 2.11 plots the left and right sides of equation 2.18 as separate time series. The
results are robust: the price of fossil fuel can be almost completely accounted for by
the ratio of nominal GDP to mining sector productivity (implying that biophysical
considerations have a great power in our economy).
Thus, we can conclude that the price of energy is not arbitrary. Rather, when
contextualized against the value of the entire economy, the price of energy seems
to be fundamentally determined by the biophysical productivity of the mining sec-
tor. This is an important result, because it allows us to ultimately ground monetary
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feedback in what is arguably the most important process of an industrial economy:
the exploitation of fossil fuels.
To summarize our results, we find that the evidence for decoupling almost com-
pletely disappears when nominal GDP is deflated by the price of electricity, rather
than by the GDP deflator. Evidence also suggests that the relation between nominal
GDP and the price of fossil fuel is arbitrated by the biophysical productivity of the
mining sector. I have hypothesized that this implies that evidence for decoupling
is a methodological artifact – a result of the decision to measure output in terms
of monetary value. The evidence presented here supports the alternative hypothe-
sis that monetary value functions as a feedback device for controlling biophysical
throughput.
2.5 Decoupling in Theory and Reality: What Goes Wrong
The neoclassical argument for decoupling is simple and intuitive: either through
technological progress or input substitution, the economy can become more efficient
at transforming natural resources into final output. However, when we attempt to
apply this theoretical argument to the real world by measuring the decoupling of
output from input, we find that the concept of decoupling is plagued by fundamental
epistemological problems.
Decoupling metrics are a subset of a larger class of output/input metrics in which
the efficiency of a system is defined in terms of its output per unit of input. In my
view, all sound efficiency metrics must satisfy three basic requirements: 1) flow
consistency, 2) boundary consistency, and 3) unit consistency.
Flow consistency means that we should track the flow of the same substance
through the system. For instance, when measuring the efficiency of an internal com-
bustion engine, we continuously follow the flow of energy through the system. Thus,
engine efficiency is defined as the useful energy output per unit of total energy in-
put. If we do not maintain flow consistency, then the notion of efficiency becomes
ambiguous. For instance, the efficiency of a computer is not easily defined. If we
track energy inputs, we run into the problem that the energetic output of a computer
(the work done on the electrons in its circuits) is of little interest to computer users.
Instead, computer users care about outputs of processor speed, information storage
capacity, and a host of other qualities. Thus, to calculate the ‘efficiency’ of a com-
puter we must break flow consistency and measure output on a different basis than
input. By doing so, we forgo the possibility of a single metric for the efficiency of a
computer; instead, we get a different efficiency metric for each relevant output that
is chosen.
Moving on to boundary consistency, Giampietro et al. (2013) note that well-
defined system boundaries are a prerequisite for any quantitative analysis. A bound-
ary definition allows us to differentiate between what is ‘inside’ and what is ‘out-
side’ the system. The consistency of boundary definitions is essential for the calcu-
lation of an efficiency metric. For instance, when calculating the efficiency of a car,
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one must stipulate whether the system includes the entire car, or only the passengers
inside the car. In the former case, the kinetic energy of the car is ‘inside’ the system
and counts as an output; however, in the latter case, the kinetic energy of the car
is ‘outside’ the system and counts as waste (only the kinetic energy of passengers
is counted as useful output). The resulting efficiency metric will be different for
each boundary definition. While both calculations are ‘correct’, it is meaningless to
compare efficiency metrics that are based on different boundaries definitions. Fur-
thermore, the system boundary used to account for inputs must remain the same as
the boundary used to account for outputs. This is easily accomplished in a simple
system, but more difficult in a complex system (see below).
Lastly, unit consistency is essential for a well-defined efficiency metric (or any
calculation, for that matter). If the basic unit of measurement is not well-defined,
then quantitative analysis becomes impossible.
Let us now apply these concepts to the neoclassical treatment of decoupling. In
abstract form, the idea is seductively simple: the economy grows progressively more
efficient at transforming resources into output, and we can measure this efficiency
in terms of an output/input ratio. When applied to energy, this becomes the GDP
output per unit of energy (or the inverse, the energy intensity of GDP).
However, when we move from theory to the real world, the neoclassical notion of
decoupling is beset by fundamental epistemological difficulties. First, we encounter
a problem of flow consistency. When following energy inputs, the only way that flow
consistency can be maintained is by adopting the Ayres-Warr notion of efficiency,
where ‘output’ is measured in energetic terms as useful work (although I would
argue that useful work still constitutes an ‘input’). If we adopt this approach, we
find that energy conversion technology has become more efficient, but the growth
of this efficiency has strict upper bounds set by the laws of thermodynamics. Thus,
the neoclassical notion of perpetual decoupling becomes impossible.
Unlike the Ayres-Warr method, the conventional approach to the measurement
of economic efficiency is to abandon the flow of energy after it enters the econ-
omy and to instead shift to a notion of ‘economic output’. By doing so, we lose
flow consistency. On the input side we track energy flows, but on the output side
we track ‘economic output’, which consists partly of biophysical flows (the pro-
duction of goods), but also of human activity (services). It is far from clear what
aggregating such disparate phenomena means. By losing flow consistency, we lose
the uniqueness of our measure, since there are many possible ways that ‘economic
output’ might be defined. For instance, it might make sense to define all services as
inputs, thereby counting only the production of goods as output. I have argued that
from a biophysical standpoint, the only ‘output’ of the entire economy is its waste.
All internal outputs are destined to become inputs to other process. Thus, the very
notion of an ‘economic output’ is ill-defined.
We also run into problems with boundary definitions. For instance, when measur-
ing energy inputs, the ‘economic system’ is implicitly defined to include any human
activity that involves the use of energy (meaning all human activity). However, the
conventional approach to measuring outputs relies on a different boundary defini-
tion. By measuring ‘economic output’, we are concerned only with the subset of
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human activity that is monetized. Thus, the well-paid banker produces an ‘output’
but the unpaid housewife does not. When we compare ‘economic output’ with en-
ergy inputs, we are actually using different boundary definitions of the economic
system (monetized human activity vs. all human activity). This inconsistency un-
dermines the validity of our efficiency metric.
Lastly, there is no objective unit on which to measure ‘economic output’. As dis-
cussed extensively in section 2.3, real GDP is plagued by a fundamental instability
in its basic unit (price), meaning unit consistency is not maintained.
Thus, when moving from neoclassical theory to the real world, our ability to
measure decoupling is undermined by serious (and I would argue, insurmountable)
epistemological difficulties. The conventional measure of decoupling – the energy
intensity of GDP – fails all three conditions for an effective efficiency metric. Thus,
any evidence for decoupling that is provided by this metric should be met with
appropriate scepticism. As such, I argue that the neoclassical notion of decoupling
is untestable.
2.6 Conclusions: Monetary Value as a Feedback
I have proposed that we abandon the conventional approach of using monetary value
to measure output. Instead, I argue that we should treat monetary value as a feedback
device that controls the flow of biophysical throughput. When we undertake this
paradigm shift, the evidence for decoupling disappears. Indeed, we find that kWh-
deflated GDP is strongly coupled with changes in the flow of useful work. This does
not mean, however, that financial constraints are the ultimate arbiters of biophysical
flows. Rather, I argue that financial constraints are a manifestation (in feedback
form) of more fundamental problems.
In my opinion, there are three ways in which energy inputs (or any other resource
input) to the economy may be constrained:
1. Biophysical scarcity: Our ability to consume energy depends fundamentally on
both the quantity and quality (i.e. EROI) of an energy resource.
2. Technological capacity: Exosomatic energy resources cannot be exploited by
humanity without the use of technology that transforms this energy into a form
usable by humans (useful work).
3. Social organization/coordination: In a complex society, the mobilization of an
energy throughput requires the coordination of many individuals. If such coor-
dination cannot be mustered, energy throughput will be constrained.
If anything can be garnered from the study of economic history, it is that when
the economy bumps up against one or more of the above three constraints, indi-
viduals rarely perceive the truth of what is occurring. Instead, such constraints are
universally perceived as a financial problem.
We can understand this by way of an analogy with the human body. The body is
a complex system with many feedback mechanisms, some of which are conscious.
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Conscious feedback manifests itself as a ‘feeling’. When the body requires more
energy, we ‘feel’ hungry. When the immune system is under attack, we ‘feel’ un-
well. When the body requires time for recuperation, we ‘feel’ tired. In all cases, the
‘feeling’ is a sensory manifestation of a deeper physiological issue.
In the case of the economy, financial constraints are not a ‘cause’ of economic
problems; instead they are a manifestation of a deeper biophysical/social issue. The
difference, however, is that in the human sensory system, feedback is qualitative.
The advantage to this qualitative feedback is that we are able to distinguish between
different ‘feelings’, allowing us to respond appropriately. In the case of the economy,
monetary feedback is quantitative. This has the advantage of being very ‘precise’,
but the disadvantage is that different constraints become indistinguishable when
expressed in feedback form.
This leads to a peculiar problem – when faced with constraints on the economy,
we often ‘blame the messenger’. To confirm this, one need only look at the ubiqui-
tous claims made by politicians that scarcity of money is the source of the problem.
Yet at the level of humanity as a whole, such claims are nonsensical. Money is a
creation of the human imagination. To claim that problems arise from a scarcity of
money is equivalent to claiming that the stars in the sky cannot be counted because
there are not enough numbers. As Soddy (1926) long ago noted, the creation of
money is bound not by the laws of thermodynamics but by the laws of mathematics
– hence its creation has no upper bound. Therefore, when we witness a financial
constraint (and we witness them all the time) we must insist that this is actually a
barometer for a more fundamental process that is occurring.
We can use the empirical results of this chapter to elucidate this principle. My
contention is that kWh-specific purchasing power represents a rough proxy for our
ability to finance the consumption of useful work. An increase in this indicator
means that useful work becomes ‘cheaper’. Our response to this signal is to consume
more useful work (or to accelerate the growth of this consumption). Alternatively,
when kWh-specific purchasing power decreases, useful work becomes ‘dearer’. Our
response to this signal is to consume less useful work (or to slow the growth of our
consumption).
Yet the great historical changes in useful work growth rates are not ‘caused’ by
financial feedback. Such feedback is ultimately an indicator of either a biophysical,
technological, or social constraint (or a combination of the three). Our investigation
of the productivity of the mining sector can give us further insight. Mining sector
biophysical labor productivity is a joint outcome of biophysical, technological, and
social constraints. Better technology will act to increase productivity, while declin-
ing resource quantity (and quality) will have the opposite effect. Social constraints
also play a role. For instance, the 1970s OPEC embargo prompted a rapid rise in
US drilling rates without a corresponding increase in oil production (Guilford et al,
2011). The result was that productivity declined greatly, but recovered once the em-
bargo ended and drilling intensity relaxed.
Empirical evidence shows that the productivity of the mining sector acts as an
arbiter between the price of fossil fuels and the nominal value of the economy.
Thus, what is manifested as a financial phenomenon (the ‘cheapness’ or ‘dearness’
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of fossil fuels) is actually a reflection of a very concrete biophysical reality – our
ability to harvest fossil fuels.
In this chapter, we found evidence of a stable and long-term coupling between
the consumption of energy and the ability of the economy to finance this consump-
tion. This gives strong support for the hypothesis that monetary value functions as
a feedback device. This result has important implications for a biophysical growth
theory. Given the strong historical evidence, we can expect that future energy con-
straints will appear as financial constraints. Indeed, this may already be occurring.
The strength of a biophysical growth theory will lie in its ability to demonstrate
that the ultimate cause of these financial problems has little to do with money and
everything to do with biophysical reality.
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Chapter 3
Distribution
The produce of the earth ... is divided among three classes of the
community ... To determine the laws which regulate this distribution,
is the principal problem in Political Economy.
– David Ricardo (1817)
As David Ricardo’s statement makes clear, classical political economists were
keenly interested in issues of economic distribution. Within political economy, ba-
sic explanations of distribution fell into two broad approaches – one that appealed
to conflict and one that appealed to the harmony of the market. The conflict school
is best characterized by the theories of Karl Marx (1867), who theorized that distri-
bution was the result of worker versus capitalist class struggle. The harmony school
can be traced back to Adam Smith (1776). While his work contained elements of
both harmony and conflict, it was Smith who put forward the basic tenet of the
invisible hand: the self-serving actions of individuals, operating in a free market,
function to benefit society as a whole.
The so-called marginal revolution of the late 19th century, spearheaded first by
Menger (1871), Jevons (1879), and Walras (1896) and later by Marshall (1890),
Wicksteed (1894), and Clark (1899), gave mathematical rigour to Smith’s quali-
tative theories. This new-classical, or neoclassical, approach theorized that under
conditions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale, the size of one’s in-
come was proportional to the marginal productivity of one’s labor and/or property.
Milton Friedman (1962) summarizes this dictum succinctly: “to each according to
what he and the instruments he owns produces”.
Because income is theorized to be proportional to productivity, when adopting
the neoclassical approach, one is much more likely to conclude that existing income
distribution is ‘fair’.1 The result of this theoretical world-view is that distribution
effectively becomes a non-issue. Thus, as neoclassical theory began to dominate
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economic thinking and teaching, interest in distributional issues waned. Atkinson
and Bourguignon note that:
[I]n the second half of the century, there were indeed times when interest in the
distribution of income was at a low ebb, [with] economists appearing to believe
that differences in distributive outcomes were of second order importance com-
pared with changes in overall economic performance. (2001, p. 7265)
Nowhere was this disinterest more clear than in the development of neoclassical
growth theory, which effectively swept away issues of distribution entirely. Bertola
et al. write:
While early growth models in the post-Keynesian tradition were still strongly
concerned with distributional issues, subsequent “new-classical” theoretical de-
velopments removed distribution from the set of macroeconomic issues of in-
terest ... The distribution of income and wealth across consumers was viewed
as a passive outcome of aggregate dynamics and market interactions, and little
attention was paid to feedback effects from distribution into growth and other
macroeconomic phenomena. (2006, p. x) [emphasis added]
Thus, permeating neoclassical growth theory is the assumption that distribution
is unimportant to growth. But is such an assumption justified? In order to answer
this question, this chapter investigates the link between growth and three types of
distribution:
Functional: Distribution by income type (i.e. rent, profit, wages, etc.)
Debtor/Creditor: Distributional claims on future production
Personal: Distribution by income size (i.e. income inequality)
In this chapter, each of these assumptions is subjected to empirical test. In all cases,
the results show that growth and distribution are fundamentally linked, meaning
neoclassical growth theory assumes away a core component of the growth process.
3.1 Measuring Growth
Before we can investigate the link between distribution and growth, we must first
settle on a method for measuring the scale of the economy. This matter is not trivial.
The notion of ‘scale’ has no meaning without an observer first stipulating both the
criteria and methodology by which ‘scale’ is to be defined and measured. Different
choices will yield radically different results, all of which are ‘rigorous’ and ‘cor-
rect’. Giampietro et al. call this the “epistemological predicament associated with
purposive quantitative analysis ... the observer always affects what is observed when
defining the descriptive domain” (2006, p. 307).
Economists make the pre-analytic decision to measure economic scale in terms
of monetary value. However, this approach leads to a quagmire of difficulties stem-
1 The catch is that one’s productivity depends upon one’s initial property endowment, which could
be decidedly unequal. However, questions surrounding the equity of this initial endowment are
generally relegated to disciplines outside economics (i.e. sociology).
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ming from the fact that the basic unit of measurement (price) undergoes non-
homogeneous changes through time. Furthermore, the quality of output changes
over time, and there are no objective means for measuring such qualitative change.
Due to these problems, I abandon the real GDP approach for the remainder of this
book. Instead, I propose focusing on a biophysical definition of scale. While there
are many possible ways that biophysical scale might be defined, I choose to focus
on energy flows.
Astrophysicist Eric Chaisson writes that “energy, the ability to do work, is the
most universal currency known in natural sciences” (2005, p. 21). Energy flows are
a pre-requisite for the existence of any complex system. Without such flows, the sec-
ond law of thermodynamics stipulates that all roads lead to equilibrium. Individual
organisms, ecosystems, and human societies can all be treated as different types of
non-equilibrium systems that maintain their complexity through energy dissipation
(Kondepudi and Prigogine, 1998).
The basic conceptual model of a non-equilibrium system is displayed in Fig-
ure 3.1. The system exists because of some sort of energy flow. Most of this energy
simply passes through the system, but some of it (useful work) is used to main-
tain/increase the internal order of the system. In the case of humans, the energy flow
is the chemical energy in food, the waste energy is radiative heat plus the chemical
energy in undigested excrement, and the useful work is the cellular metabolism that
maintains our structure and allows us to grow/reproduce.2
Non-Equilibrium
System
Waste EnergyPrimary Energy
Useful Work
Fig. 3.1 A Conceptual Model of a Non-Equilibrium System
As an analogy to biological metabolism, we can refer to human society (or the
economy) as having a social metabolism (Giampietro et al, 2012; Martinez-Alier,
2007). In specific form, an individual’s metabolism is wildly different than an entire
society’s social metabolism. However, on a conceptual level they are identical: some
form of useful work must constantly be done in order to counterbalance the forces
of entropy. If either system is to grow, more useful work must be done.
For the remainder of the book, I use Ayres and Warr’s estimates of useful work
as a measure of the biophysical scale of the economy. This data is freely available
from Warr’s REXS database (Warr, 2009). When useful work data is unavailable
2 We ignore the added complication that energy from food is also used to do work on systems that
are external to the body (ie: manual labor).
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(for instance, on an international or sub-national scale) I simply use primary energy
consumption. I make no arguments that this approach is better or more accurate than
using real GDP as a measure of scale – only that it is more physically meaningful
and requires fewer subjective decisions. I believe that a biophysical growth theory
should give insight into how changes in energy consumption affect society. By using
energy as our measure of scale, such insight is automatically embedded in the theory.
3.2 Functional Distribution
To discuss the role of functional distribution in neoclassical growth theory, we return
to the Cobb-Douglas production function used in the Solow-Swan model:
Y = ALβKα (3.1)
Recall that α represents the income share of capital and β the income share
of labor, and that both are theorized to be proportional to each factor’s marginal
productivity. While α and β could conceivably be treated as variables, in practice
they are treated as constants. This tradition has its origins in the work of Cobb and
Douglas (1928), who showed that fixed exponents could be used to model histori-
cal production. The constancy of factor shares was later formalized by of Nicholas
Kaldor (1957) who put forward a list of six stylized facts about economic growth,
one of which was the historical tendency for capital and labor income shares to
remain approximately constant over time (about 1/3 and 2/3 respectively). In neo-
classical growth theory, it has become standard practice to assume that functional
income distribution is constant. From this, the following assumption is implicit:
Functional Distribution Assumption:
Changes in functional distribution are unrelated to growth.
As a rough first estimate, functional distribution is approximately constant over
time; however there are major oscillations around the long-term average, especially
if we disaggregate capitalist income into its constituent parts. For instance, over the
period 1929-2012, profit represented an average of 10.2% of the US national income
(data from BEA Table 1.12). However, the relative standard deviation in this share
was a non-trivial 27%, meaning variability was roughly 1/3 as large as the mean.
If we treat profit’s share as a constant, then we implicitly assume that these large
deviations from the long-term average are unimportant.
Rather than use the capital-labor binary of neoclassical growth theory, I use the 5
types of income represented in the national accounts: wages, profit, proprietor, inter-
est, and rent. Wages represent the income of all employees, both salaried and waged.
Profit represents the income of owners of incorporated businesses, while proprietor
represents the income of unincorporated businesses (mostly self-employment and
partnerships). Interest represents the income of creditors (owners of debt). Lastly,
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Wages
Profit
Proprietor
Interest
Rent
Other
United States
2012
Fig. 3.2 The Income Pie
Sources: BEA Table 1.12
rent represents the income of owners of specific property (natural resources, land,
intellectual property, etc.).3 The US 2012 income ‘pie’ is displayed in Figure 3.2
Our goal is to investigate how distribution between these 5 income types is re-
lated to the growth of useful work. My methodology is to compare relative changes
in functional distribution with changes in useful work production. This approach is
an adaptation of the methodology used by Bichler and Nitzan (2013) for a similar
investigation into the link between distribution and unemployment. Thus, we com-
pare the annual rate of change in the share of each income type to the annual rate of
change of useful work. Equation 3.2 shows a sample calculation for profit (pi). Here
Y refers to national income, Upc refers to useful work per capita, and (̂) denotes
growth rate. Correlations for this procedure, carried out across the 5 income-types,
are shown in Table 3.1. [̂pi
Y
]
⇐⇒ Ûpc (3.2)
The results show that there is significant correlation between the growth of useful
work and changes in the income share of both profit and interest. All other income
types show much smaller correlation. Profit is the only income type to show sig-
nificant positive correlation with growth. Thus, profit experiences an increase in
share during periods of expansion (Fig.3.3). Interest, on the other hand, experiences
relative growth during periods of contraction.
What we are seeing in this data is mostly fluctuations due to business cycles;
however, the results are not as straightforward as they might seem. Because of the
importance of profit to capitalist economies, one is tempted to assume that the share
of profit is at a maximum during the peak of the business cycle (here defined as a
peak in useful work growth rates). This would mean that maximum profit equates
3 The rent category is complicated by the accepted practice of treating home ownership as a busi-
ness activity. Thus, the BEA calculates an imputed rent for all owner-occupied buildings. To whom
this rent is actually paid remains unclear.
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Income Type R2
Profit 0.52
Interest (−)0.28
Rent (−)0.16
Wages (−)0.15
Proprietor 0.08
Table 3.1 Correlation Between Income Redistribution and Useful Work Growth
Note: Data is for correlation between annual growth rate of useful work per capita and annual
change in each factor’s share of national income. Profit correlation excludes the years 1932-33;
when included R2 drops to 0.23. All income data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.12.
Data series: Corporate profits (before tax) with IVA and CCAdj, Net interest and miscellaneous
payments, Rental income of persons with CCAdj, Compensation of employees, Proprietors’ in-
come with IVA and CCAdj. Data for useful work and US population is from Benjamin Warr’s
REXS database.
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with maximum growth. However, this turns out to be untrue. The correlation be-
tween profit’s share of national income and useful work growth rates is virtually nil
(R2 = 0.002). It is not the share of profit, but its rate of change that is correlated
with growth. Useful work growth is at its peak when the rate of change of the share
of profit is at a maximum.
While these results are in many ways perplexing, they do make one thing clear:
it is misguided to assume (as neoclassical theory does) that changes in functional
distribution are not important to growth. But to be fair to neoclassical growth theory,
it is important to recognize that the Solow-Swan model was never intended to give
insight into business cycles. However, the focus on stable, ‘balanced’ growth and
the avoidance of cyclical fluctuations is problematic in its own right. The current
understanding of non-equilibrium systems is that short-term fluctuations play an
instrumental role in the creation of order – what physicist Ilya Prigogine calls “order
through fluctuations” (Kondepudi and Prigogine, 1998).
As the results indicate, fluctuations in functional distribution show significant
connection with growth. By ignoring such fluctuations, neoclassical growth theory
maintains simplicity by assuming away a key piece of the puzzle. Can a biophysical
growth theory explain why fluctuations in profit are so important to growth? The
empirical results of Chapter 4 suggest one plausible explanation. It seems that large
corporations play a fundamental role in the growth of energy consumption. Given
that the primary goal of such corporations is to make a profit, building on our results
from Chapter 2, we might hypothesize that profit functions as a feedback mechanism
that influences the behaviour of business. If business is ultimately in control of the
economy, fluctuations in profit would tend to dominate other forms of feedback
(wages, proprietor income, etc.). While plausible, an investigation of this hypothesis
must be left for future research.
3.3 Debtor/Creditor Distribution
In the preceding section, we saw that changes in the interest share of national income
were negatively correlated with the growth of useful work. This raises an important
question: since interest accrues to the owners of debt (i.e. creditors), how is debt
related to growth?
As Foster and Magdoff (2009) emphasize, debt is a distributional issue. How-
ever, it is one that is slightly different from our previous discussion. While interest
payments are the present income stream derived from debt, the debt itself repre-
sents the total amount owed to the creditor. Debt is thus a distributional claim, made
by creditors, on the future income of debtors. In this section, we investigate how
debtor/creditor distribution is related to biophysical growth.
First, we note that debt is completely absent from the Solow-Swan model, leading
to the following implicit assumption:
Debt Assumption: Debt levels are unrelated to growth.
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In order to understand this assumption, we must trace a long lineage of theory. We
begin by looking at the Solow-Swan capital accumulation formula:
K˙ = sY −σK (3.3)
Aside from technological progress, which is unexplained, capital accumulation
is the main engine of growth in the Solow-Swan model. In equation 3.3, K˙ repre-
sents the rate of change of capital (i.e. the rate of capital accumulation), s represents
the savings rate, Y the quantity of total production, σ the rate of capital depreciation
(how quickly capital goods decay), and K the size of the capital stock. The logic
behind this equation is that savings are a form of abstinence from present consump-
tion. If the savings rate is zero, all that is produced is consumed, and no capital is
accumulated (K˙ ≤ 0). However, if some actors forgo consumption, this abstinence
will take the form of savings (s > 0). The portion of production that is saved (sY )
can then be invested in the production of capital goods. So long as total investment
(sY ) is greater than total depreciation (σK), capital will accumulate (K˙ > 0).
Thus, it is the savings rate, by and large, that determines the level of capital accu-
mulation in the Solow-Swan model. Paradoxically, this emphasis on savings exists
without any reference to the role of money. This absence is indicative of the neoclas-
sical view that money is a neutral facilitator of exchange. Parguez and Seccareccia
elaborate:
The starting proposition of the neoclassical approach ... is that money is to be
introduced within an otherwise pre-existing pure barter economy ... All monetary
transactions are de facto of the same nature as barter exchange with a nume´raire
money having been introduced to it. (2000, p. 113)
In the Solow-Swan model, the savings rate represents physical abstinence from
consumption, but is accounted for in terms of the monetary value of savings. Neo-
classical theory assumes that these two forms are equivalent (Nitzan and Bichler,
2009). Since money plays a passive bookkeeping role, there is no need for it in
neoclassical growth theory. Milton Friedman summarizes the neoclassical position:
“nothing is so unimportant as the quantity of money expressed in terms of the nom-
inal monetary unit” (1969, p. 1).
However, we are left with a sticky question: if the value of output grows, must
not the amount of money in existence grow as well? How is this accomplished? In
neoclassical theory, the money supply is an exogenous parameter determined by the
central bank. This institution first creates the monetary base, and then sets the frac-
tional reserve rate, which determines the rate at which commercial banks can ‘mul-
tiply’ this base. Thus, in neoclassical theory, money creation is an exogenous and
“neutral”4 parameter that is controlled by a “benevolent monetary dictator” (Arestis
and Sawyer, 2001, p. 201), which in the US, is the Federal Reserve Bank.
This is in marked contrast to the ‘endogenous’ money theory of the post-
Keynesian tradition, in which debt/credit relations are theorized to play a central role
4 On this topic, Keynes joked, “The [theoretical] conditions required for the ‘neutrality’ of money
... are, I suspect, precisely the same as those which will ensure that crises do not occur” (1971, p.
410).
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in the creation of money. In endogenous money theory, money is created whenever
credit is advanced. For instance, a farmer may obtain grain seed on credit, whereby
the seller holds an IOU from the farmer. This extension of credit creates money (the
IOU). However, its viability (beyond the two-person relationship in which it was
created) depends on the degree to which other people trust the farmer’s ability to
repay his debts. If the farmer commands great esteem, the IOU can circulate widely.
In principle, anyone can create money in this manner. In practice, however, com-
mercial banks have almost completely monopolized this process. According to en-
dogenous money theory, when advancing credit, banks do not lend savers’ money;
rather, they create money out of nothing and register it as an outstanding debt. In-
terestingly, the Bank of England itself recently endorsed this view:
In the modern economy, most money takes the form of bank deposits. But how
those bank deposits are created is often misunderstood: the principal way is
through commercial banks making loans. Whenever a bank makes a loan, it si-
multaneously creates a matching deposit in the borrower’s bank account, thereby
creating new money. (McLeay et al, 2014, p.1)
Endogenous money theory has important implications regarding debt. Most im-
portantly, the growth of the money supply is dependent on increasing the total out-
standing debt. The money supply, in turn, is related to the value of total production
(Yn) by the following identity:
MV ≡ Yn (3.4)
This restatement of Irving Fisher’s (1911) famous equation of exchange 5 tells us
that if the value of production increases, either the money supply M or the transac-
tion ‘velocity’ of money in final expenditures (V ) must increase. Since the latter is
usually assumed to be constant, it follows that increases in the value of production
must be accompanied by an increase in the amount of money. According to endoge-
nous money theory, this requires an increase in debt, leading to the conclusion that
the growth of debt is inherently important to the growth of value.
Within the neoclassical tradition, on the other hand, debt is regarded as passive
and has no involvement in the creation of money (see Hudson, 2011 for a good
review of the neoclassical treatment of debt). Rather, debt is explained in terms
of the loanable funds model, in which savers loan their funds to borrowers (and
banks act as intermediaries6). In his textbook on macroeconomics, Gregory Mankiw
explains:
The supply of loanable funds comes from people who have some extra income
they want to save and lend out. This lending can occur directly, such as when a
household buys a bond from a firm, or it can occur indirectly, such as when a
household makes a deposit in a bank, which in turn uses the funds to make loans.
In both cases, saving is the source of the supply of loanable funds. (2011, p. 268)
5 Fisher’s original equation is MV ≡ PQ, where Q is the quantity of transactions and P is the
average price level. The right-hand side is equivalent to nominal GDP.
6 One might question how valid it is to treat banks as mere intermediaries when their business
model becomes heavily geared towards speculative securities.
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In the loanable funds model, changes in debt levels (i.e. debt inflation or deflation)
are theorized to be unimportant. Ben Bernanke summarizes this position:
Debt-deflation represent[s] no more than a redistribution from one group (debtors)
to another (creditors). Absent implausibly large differences in marginal spending
propensities among the groups ... pure redistributions should have no significant
macro-economic effects. (1994, p.17) [emphasis added]
Interestingly, the Great Recession has precipitated a rather fierce debate between
Steve Keen and Paul Krugman on the merits of endogenous and exogenous money
theory (Keen argues for the former and Krugman the latter). Amidst the debate,
Krugman dismisses the importance of debt:
Ignoring the foreign component, or looking at the world as a whole, we see that
the overall level of debt makes no difference to aggregate net worth – one per-
son’s liability is another person’s asset. It follows that the level of debt matters
only if the distribution of net worth matters, if highly indebted players face dif-
ferent constraints from players with low debt. (Krugman, 2012, p. 146)[cited in
Keen, 2014, p. 5)
We thus have two diametrically opposed schools of thought: the neoclassical
school suggests that growth and debt levels are unrelated, while the endogenous
money school suggests that the two ought to be fundamentally related. As is com-
mon in economics, the debate between these two schools has largely played out on a
theoretical level. In this book, however, we are concerned with empirical evidence.
We begin by looking at the relation between the growth of nominal GDP and the
growth of total debt (Fig. 3.4). The evidence is clear: the growth rate of the value
of production is highly coupled with the growth rate of total debt. This lends good
empirical support for endogenous money theory. However, we must be careful not
to conflate the growth of value (nominal GDP) with the growth of biophysical scale
(useful work). The two are entirely different. Noting this, we still have no indication
of the relation between debt and biophysical growth.
We can investigate this relation by dividing total debt (D) by nominal GDP (Yn),
giving us the ‘debt-to-GDP’ ratio. We then compare the annual percentage change
in this ratio to the annual growth rate of useful work per capita:[̂
D
Yn
]
⇐⇒ Ûpc (3.5)
The results, shown in Figure 3.5, are unequivocal. Changes in outstanding debt,
measured against the value of current production, exhibit a tight, negative correla-
tion with the growth of useful work. We can immediately conclude that the Solow-
Swan assumption that debt levels are unimportant to growth is contradicted by the
empirical evidence.
Since debt carries units of $ and nominal GDP carries units of $/year, the debt-
to-GDP ratio carries units of years. We can interpret this as the hypothetical time re-
quired to pay existing debts if the total value of present-day production were devoted
to this task. The shorter this time period, the more feasible is debt repayment. Figure
3.5 indicates that the ability to repay debt is highly coupled to biophysical growth.
When the biophysical scale of the economy expands, debt repayment becomes more
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feasible. Conversely, when the economy undergoes biophysical contraction, debt re-
payment becomes less feasible. Note, however, that we cannot determine causation
from this data: debt levels could be driving growth rates, or vice versa. Or, the two
might exist in a coupled feedback relation in which causation is circular. Without a
deeper investigation (which exceeds the scope of this book) causation must remain
ambiguous.
Note that the relation between debt and useful work is not simplistic. If we break
the correlation between useful work and debt-to-GDP into pre and post-1970 eras,
we get very different results. For the period 1916-1970, the correlation is strong
(R2 = 0.66); however, for the period 1971-2000, correlation between useful work
and debt-to-GDP is non-existent (R2 = 0.005). Thus, there is a clear structural
change that took place around 1970. This corresponds with the end of the gold
standard and the introduction of neoliberal policies geared towards trade liberaliza-
tion. It also coincides with a peak in the labor productivity of the mining sector (Fig.
2.10), a peak in US oil production, and the explosion of the US trade deficit. While
interesting, I leave an investigation into this structural change for future work.
The relation between debtor/creditor levels and biophysical growth is evidently
complex. While we can safely conclude that neoclassical growth theory’s dismissal
of debt is not justified by the evidence, we cannot substitute this dismissal with a
simple, deterministic relation.
3.4 Personal Distribution
In his textbook on economic growth theory, Daron Acemoglu notes that in order
to justify the use of an aggregate production function, neoclassical growth theory
must assume that the economy permits the use of a representative household. As
Acemoglu puts it, this means that the “preference (demand) side of the economy
can be represented as if there were a single household making the aggregate con-
sumption and saving decisions” (2008, p. 149, emphasis added). This amounts to
the assumption that the group of all households can be meaningfully represented by
its average.
However, when we represent a group by its average, we lose information. Con-
sider a 100 household economy with a representative (or average) household income
of $50,000. By looking only at the representative household, we cannot distinguish
between: 1) an economy in which all 100 household earn exactly $50,000 each; and
2) an economy in which 99 households earn nothing and one household earns $5
million. Thus, the use of an aggregate production function– and accompanying rep-
resentative household – requires that we ignore personal income distribution and its
associated inequalities. We can conclude that the Solow-Swan model, which has an
aggregate production function at its heart, requires the following implicit assump-
tion:
3.4 Personal Distribution 55
Personal Distribution Assumption:
Income inequality is unrelated to growth.
While the Solow-Swan model assumes away any link between personal income
distribution and growth, the equity-growth connection (or lack thereof) remains
highly contested in economic theory. Two opposing schools exist that advance mu-
tually contradictory theories. The ‘trickle-down’ (supply-side) school argues that
income inequality is good for growth, while the ‘underconsumption’ (demand-side)
school argues that inequality is harmful to growth. Both theories hinge on the as-
sumption that the ‘marginal propensity to save’ (the change in savings per change
in income) differs between income classes.
The notion of differential savings rates among income classes can be traced back
to post-Keynesian economists Nicholas Kaldor and Luigi Pasinetti. Kaldor (1955)
argued that the marginal propensity to save should be greater among capitalists than
among workers, while Pasinetti (1962) argued that the marginal propensity to save
was an increasing function of income size (regardless of functional income-type).
Since the rich have a greater marginal propensity to save than the poor, the trickle-
down school argues that an increase in inequality will result in increased savings.
According to neoclassical growth theory, the savings rate determines the rate of cap-
ital accumulation, which is, in turn, one of the main engines of growth. Thus, it fol-
lows that greater income inequality should ultimately yield an increase in growth.7
Underconsumption theory turns this logic on its head by focusing on the role of
consumption (rather than savings) in driving growth. This school asserts that con-
sumption plays a crucial role in driving demand for the goods and services that are
produced. It is demand (not savings) that drives growth. Since lower income classes
have a greater ‘marginal propensity to consume’ (the reverse of the propensity to
save), a decrease in income inequality should lead to an increase in effective demand
and, hence, greater growth. This approach is most often associated with Keynesians
such as Kalecki (1971) and Keynes himself, and is now argued for prominently by
Robert Reich (2013) and Joseph Stiglitz (2013).
Combining underconsumption and trickle-down theory with the Solow-Swan
model assumptions, we cover the full range of possible connections between in-
equality and growth: harmful, beneficial, and unrelated. In order to test this link, we
apply a methodology similar to the previous sections. We compare the percentage
rate of change of inequality – quantified in terms of the fractional income share of
the top 10% ( fT10% ) – with the percentage rate of change of useful work per capita:
8
f̂ T10% ⇐⇒ Ûpc (3.6)
The results, shown in Figure 3.6, demonstrate that personal income redistribu-
tion (i.e. the rate of change of income distribution) is correlated with biophysical
7 As Keynes pointed out, this argument falls apart if savings are hoarded rather than invested.
8 Note that we are comparing the change in income inequality with the change in useful work per
capita (i.e. first derivatives). If we compare the level of income inequality (not its rate of change)
with the rate of change of useful work per capita, there is no correlation at all (R2 = 3.0×10−4).
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growth. Although the correlation is lower than for functional and debtor/creditor
distribution, we can still conclude, contrary to the assumptions made by the Solow-
Swan model, that personal income distribution is related to growth. Furthermore,
we can state that the evidence does not support trickle-down theory: rates of change
of inequality are negatively correlated with growth. Thus, there is no evidence that
allowing the wealthy to increase their share of income increases biophysical growth.
Having eliminated two of the three possible relations between inequality and
growth, it seems that the evidence must support underconsumption theory. And yet,
the matter is more complicated than it appears in Figure 3.6. If we divide the corre-
lation into two periods, as we did with debt, we find dramatically different results.
For the period 1917-1985, the correlation is negative, with an R2 of 0.28. However,
for the subsequent period (1986-2000), the relation turns slightly positive, but with
a negligible R2 of 0.08.
Furthermore, we cannot tell which way the line of causation runs. Undercon-
sumption theory firmly states that causation should run from distribution to growth –
a decrease in inequality should stimulate growth. However, we cannot eliminate the
alternative that an increase in growth simply makes downward redistribution more
palatable – that higher taxes on the wealthy are more easily swallowed when useful
work grows more quickly. Alternatively, it could be that growth leads to a shortage
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of labor, thereby increasing the bargaining power of the bottom 90%. Furthermore,
causation could be circular (i.e. feedback related), with both growth and personal in-
come distribution mutually influencing one another. Without further investigation,
which exceeds the scope of this book, we must be content with correlation and leave
the discussion on causation for a later date.
Despite the complexity of the issue, we can conclude that neoclassical growth
theory is not justified in assuming that personal income distribution is unrelated to
growth.
3.5 Conclusions: Distribution Matters
Through a series of pre-analytic decisions, neoclassical growth theory removes dis-
tribution from its scope. If this decision is justified, we would expect to find very
little correlation between rates of growth and changes in distribution. Yet the em-
pirical evidence presented in this chapter leads to the exact opposite conclusion:
biophysical growth (as measured by useful work) is systematically correlated with
changes in distribution. Clearly the implicit assumption that distribution is unrelated
to growth rests on dubious grounds.
However, if we place neoclassical growth theory in historical context, the deci-
sion to ignore distribution makes sense. The Solow-Swan model was formulated in
1956, at the dawn of an era of unprecedented expansion. After World War II, growth
became the mantra of the day. Historian J. R. McNeill summarizes:
Capitalists, nationalists – indeed almost everyone, communists included –
worshipped at this same altar because economic growth disguised a multitude of
sins. Indonesians and Japanese tolerated endless corruption as long as economic
growth lasted. Russians and eastern Europeans put up with clumsy surveillance
states. Americans and Brazilians accepted vast social inequalities. Social, moral,
and ecological ills were sustained in the interest of economic growth; indeed,
adherents to the faith proposed that only more growth could resolve such ills.
Economic growth became the indispensable ideology of the state nearly every-
where. (2000, p. 334)[as cited in Daly, 2011]
Reviewing the empirical evidence presented in this chapter, it is easy to see why
policy-makers and economists focused on growth and not on distribution. It is be-
cause growth eased distributional issues. Summarizing our findings, we can state
that increases in the useful work growth rate are related to:
1. Increases in profit’s share of national income.
2. The increased ability of debtors (both public and private) to
repay creditors.
3. Decreases in income inequality.
At the turn of the 21st century, distributional issues are once again of central in-
terest to economists and policy-makers alike. For instance, Thomas Piketty’s (2014)
book on income inequality has become an unlikely New York Times best seller. The
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evidence presented in this chapter suggests that distribution and growth are inher-
ently connected – distributional issues are magnified when biophysical growth stag-
nates. Biophysical scholars have long predicted that peak oil would spell the end
of growth (Hubbert, 1993; Heinberg, 2011; Murphy and Hall, 2011). With global
oil production currently in a plateau, we should not be surprised that distributional
issues are once again at the forefront of public interest.
As stated at the outset of the book, complexity poses a major problem for sci-
ence. Without a certain amount of idealization, science is impossible. Simplify too
far, however, and the scientific theory will be of little use. Removing the real-world
complexities of economic distribution greatly simplifies the process of explaining
growth. Yet, the evidence suggests that this simplification is misguided: the complex
business of distribution seems to be inherently connected to biophysical growth. As
such, the neoclassical assumption that distribution is unrelated to growth is insidi-
ously untrue.
From a Darwinian perspective, the control of resources is one of the major drivers
of reproductive success. Although we should not reduce this to social Darwinism,
it is naive to think that humans are somehow separate from an otherwise univer-
sal resource struggle. From the evidence presented here, it is clear that the growth
of energy consumption dampens the distributive struggle. After all, the easiest way
to reduce the competition for resources is to increase the resource ‘pie’. This ef-
fectively makes the game ‘positive sum’: there are relative winners and losers, but
overall, everyone wins. Yet the peak and decline of energy production threatens to
make the game ‘negative sum’: there will be relative winners and losers, but over
all, everyone loses. Thus, while predictions are difficult to make, a future decline
in energy consumption will almost certainly exacerbate existing distributional prob-
lems.
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Chapter 4
Institutional Size
The Modern Corporation has undermined the preconceptions of
classical economic theory as effectively as the quantum undermined
classical physics at the beginning of the 20th century.
– Gardiner Means (1957, p. 287)
The scale of both modern governments and modern corporations has no corollary
in human history. In 1957, Gardiner Means observed: “We now have single cor-
porate enterprises employing hundreds of thousands of workers, having hundreds
of thousands of stockholders, using billions of dollars worth of the instruments of
production serving millions of customers and controlled by a single management
group” (p. 288). Despite the ubiquity of large corporations and governments, neo-
classical growth theory assumes away their existence. Is such an approach empiri-
cally justified? This chapter aims to find out.
The layout of this chapter is as follows: I first dissect the neoclassical treatment
of both the firm and government in order to understand why large institutions are
systematically ignored. I then look at alternative theories of large institutions, be-
fore proceeding to an investigation of the empirical evidence linking the growth of
energy consumption to the growth of both corporate and government employment
concentration. Finally, I conclude by hypothesizing that the link between energy
consumption and institutional size might be explained in terms of hierarchy.
4.1 Institutions in Neoclassical Growth Theory
The two main institutions that dominate the modern landscape are governments
and corporations (or in economic jargon, firms). The importance of the firm is well
recognized in neoclassical theory – indeed, it is the principle unit of production.
However, because of a series of assumptions needed to justify basic neoclassical
tenets, firm size plays no role in neoclassical growth theory. Government, on the
other hand, is exogenous to neoclassical theory itself – a theory that is primarily
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aimed at modelling the undisturbed free market. Not surprisingly, government is
completely absent from the neoclassical Solow-Swan model.1 In order to understand
this neglect of large institutions, we need to better understand the basic postulates
of neoclassical theory. We begin with the model of the firm.
While the firm is the basic unit of production, little is said of its actual compo-
sition. Instead, it is treated as a black box – inputs and outputs are known, but the
internal workings of the firm remain sealed from view. All that is known about its
behavior is that it maximizes profits. Each firm is assumed to have a production
function that allows a mathematical mapping of inputs onto outputs. Neoclassical
growth theory then assumes that all such firms can be modelled by a single, aggre-
gate production function. It turns out that this approach requires two basic assump-
tions: 1) all firms (and the economy as a whole) experience constant returns to scale;
and 2) the economy is perfectly competitive.
Constant returns to scale is a property of a production function Y (K, L)2 such
that increases in the scale of capital and labor inputs yield a corresponding increase
in total output. Stated mathematically, this becomes:
Y (cK, cL) = cY (K, L) (4.1)
While, in principle, the production function of individual firms can have either con-
stant, increasing, or decreasing returns to scale, in order to maintain compatibility
with the marginal productivity theory of distribution, one must assume constant
returns to scale. When formulating marginal productivity distribution theory, neo-
classical economists ran into an ‘adding up’ problem. Joan Robinson summarizes
this issue: “How do we know that, if each factor is paid its marginal product, the
total product is disposed of without residue, positive or negative?” (1934, p. 398).
Wicksteed (1894) formulated an elegant solution to this problem using a theorem
developed by Euler. He showed that if one assumes that production exhibits constant
returns to scale, then Euler’s theorem could be used to ‘prove’ that each factor re-
ceives payment in exact accordance with its marginal productivity, thus solving the
adding up problem.3As a result of this theorem, neoclassical growth theory (which
maintains compatibility with neoclassical distribution theory) is forced to assume
that all firms have constant returns to scale. This means that size is neither an ad-
vantage nor disadvantage: all firms, large or small, are given the same production
function.
We now turn our attention to the assumption of perfect competition. Neoclas-
sical theory predicts that under conditions of perfect competition, markets will al-
1 To be fair, numerous scholars have attempted to add government to neoclassical growth the-
ory (for instance Carboni and Medda, 2011). However, in most applications, government remains
absent.
2 Quite curiously, the production function does not include energy, the single factor one might
think is most important in making something.
3 As used by Wicksteed, Euler’s Theorem states that if Y = f (a,b,c, ...) is a production function
with factors of production a,b,c, ... that exhibits constant returns to scale, then Y = a ∂Y∂a +b
∂Y
∂b +
c ∂Y∂c + .... That is, ouput Y is guaranteed to be the sum of the quantity of each factor times its
marginal productivity.
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locate resources in the most efficient manner possible (given existing patterns of
distribution).4 Here, perfect competition is used specifically to mean that firms are
price-takers: they have no market power that allows them to dictate the price of their
output. However, as Coase (1937) noted, this results in a paradox. While the firm is
the basic unit of production in neoclassical theory, the theorized efficiency of perfect
competition implies that firms should not exist. According to neoclassical logic, the
most efficient form of production should occur when competition is most atomistic
– when every individual is self-employed.
Given this paradox, why does neoclassical theory continue to assume perfect
competition? Steve Keen (2001) argues that it is because without it, the most basic
tenet of neoclassical theory – the equilibrium-seeking price mechanism – cannot be
justified. Before explaining the problem, let us first review the neoclassical explana-
tion of the market. Arthur Salter says it best:
... the normal economic system works itself. For its current operation it is under
no central control, it needs no central survey. Over the whole range of human
activity and human need, supply is adjusted to demand, and production to con-
sumption, by a process that is automatic, elastic, and responsive. (1921, p. 15)
In neoclassical theory, the equilibrium-seeking quality of the free market is ex-
plained by the forces of supply and demand. Market equilibrium occurs at the in-
tersection of supply and demand curves. These theoretical curves, in turn, are ex-
plained in terms of the behavior of individual consumers and producers. The down-
ward sloping demand curve is explained by the law of diminishing marginal utility:
a consumer will derive a decreasing amount of pleasure from each additional unit of
consumption. The upward sloping supply curve is explained by the law of increas-
ing marginal costs: each additional unit of production is assumed to become costlier
to produce.5 As long as all firms are price-takers (meaning there is perfect competi-
tion), the resulting equilibrium quantity of production is such that the market price
equals both the marginal utility of the buyer and the marginal cost of the supplier.
This elegant explanation of the price mechanism underlies all other aspects of
neoclassical theory. Yet without perfect competition, it fails to function. If firms
have even the slightest market power, then the equilibrium price will diverge from
marginal costs, causing the theory to break down. Steve Keen summarizes: “Unless
perfect competition rules, there is no supply curve” (2001, p. 101). Thus, the as-
sumption of perfect competition is central to the internal consistency of neoclassical
theory. When applied to neoclassical growth theory, this leads to the conclusion that
the optimal growth path should be through atomistic competition: large firms should
play no preferential role (indeed, they should not exist).
We now move on to the role of government in neoclassical theory. Here we find
another paradox: the perfectly competitive free market is theorized to be completely
4 This is known as the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics: under conditions of perfect
competition, market equilibrium is Pareto-efficient. It is impossible to make any one individual
better off without making at least one individual worse off.
5 One might protest that the reverse may actually be true – that each additional unit of production
will cost less. While this may be true in reality, as Harold Lydall notes, “neoclassical theory is built
on the ... assumption of absence of economies of scale” (1971 p. 91).
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self-regulating, meaning government intervention is redundant – or even harmful.
Franklin Fisher notes that “the principal policy insight of economics [is] that a com-
petitive price system produces desirable results and that government interference
will generally lead to an inefficient allocation of resources”(1987, p. 26; cited in
Murrell, 1991, p. 60). Yet markets cannot exist without the enforcement of a prop-
erty rights regime – that is, without a large, coercive institution dedicated to enforc-
ing market contracts. Milton Friedman summarizes: “The role of government ... is
to do something that the market cannot do for itself, namely, to determine, arbitrate,
and enforce the rules of the game” (1962, p. 27).
Thus, neoclassical theory explains the workings of a free market in the absence
of government intervention; however, government intervention is a prerequisite for
the existence of the free market. This paradox has never been resolved. However,
the practical way forward is to acknowledge that government must exist, but to
insist that it should be as small as possible. For instance, Friedman (ibid) insists
that the proper role of government is solely to resolve market imperfections, namely
monopoly.
Both in the case of firms and governments, neoclassical theory is unequivocal:
smaller is better. Paul Walker (2007) notes that the absence of large institutions, in
neoclassical theory, can best be understood by looking at the historical origins of
the theory itself:
The interest in the price system, culminating in the ‘perfect competition’
model, has its intellectual origins in the eighteenth-century debate between free
traders and mercantilists. This debate wasn’t about competition, in any meaning-
ful sense, and it wasn’t about the existence and organisation of the firm; it was
about the proper scope of government in an economy, and the model it gave rise
to reflects this. The central question of the debate was, Is central planning neces-
sary to avoid the problems of a chaotic economic system? Adam Smith famously
answered no.
... The formal model that arose from this examination is one which abstracts
completely from any form of centralised control in the economy. It is a model
delineated by ‘perfect decentralisation’. Authority, be it in the form of a govern-
ment or a firm or a household, plays no role in coordinating resources.
As neoclassical growth theory is primarily an extension of micro-foundations
onto the macroscopic scale, it is forced to maintain this ambivalence towards large
institutions. We can summarize this position as constituting the following implicit
assumption:
Institution Size Assumption:
Large institutions are not important to growth.
Before testing this assumption, however, I review some of the more popular expla-
nations for why large institutions exist, and how they influence growth.
4.2 Theories of Large Institutions 65
4.2 Theories of Large Institutions
Throughout the course of the 20th century, many theories have been produced that
attempt to explain the growth of both firms and governments. For the sake of brevity,
I focus here on only a few approaches that are most relevant to the present enquiry.
We begin with theories of the firm.
Theories of the Firm
Perhaps the most popular theory of the firm is Ronald Coase’s (1937) ‘transaction
cost’ approach. As discussed previously, Coase notes that the existence of firms
represents a paradox for neoclassical theory: “If production is regulated by price
movements, production could be carried on without any organization at all”. Thus,
he asks: “why is there any organization?” (p. 19) For Coase, the distinguishing char-
acteristic of the firm is the absence of the price mechanism. He postulates that firms
exist because there is a cost of using the market.
This simple postulate can then tell us why firms grow. Coase writes: “... a firm
will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the
firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an
exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm”. Firm size is
the simple result of an optimization between external transaction costs and internal
organizational costs.
While the transaction cost theory of the firm is often heralded for its expansive
explanatory scope, this is not necessarily indicative that the theory is sound. Karl
Popper (1959) argued that the hallmark of a scientific theory lies not in its explana-
tory power, but in its ability to make falsifiable predictions. Nitzan and Bichler argue
that Coasian theory is deficient in this regard:
The problem [with Coasian theory] is, first, that the cost of transactions (rel-
ative to not transacting) and the efficiency gains of transactions (relative to inter-
nalization) cannot be measured objectively; and, second, that it isn’t even clear
how to identify the relevant transactions in the first place. This measurement
limbo makes marginal transaction costs ... unobservable; and with unobservable
magnitudes, reality can never be at odds with the theory. ((2009), p. 340)
While the Coasian theory of the firm is popular among economists, an approach
called the resource-based view has become popular in the field of strategic manage-
ment (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). This theory proposes that firms can be thought
of as a bundle of resources.6 Specific resources owned by a firm can serve as a
competitive advantage that can generate an above normal profit, causing the firm
to grow. Thus, the resource-based view argues that firm growth is the result of a
resource-driven competitive advantage.
6 For the biophysical minded reader, note that since it is based in management studies, the resource-
based view of the firm is mostly concerned with human resources.
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Edith Penrose (1955) proposed that it was the pool of top management talent that
served as the most important scarce resource. She argued that, since management
required in-depth knowledge of the internal workings of the firm, the pool of po-
tential top managers could come only from within the firm’s existing employment
ranks. This has come to be known as the managerial limits to growth hypothesis,
and implies that the “availability of top managerial and technical talent serves as the
bottleneck for a firm’s growth rate in a particular period of time” (Kor and Mahoney,
2004, p. 184).
The validity of the resource-based theory of the firm (including the managerial
limits to growth hypothesis) hinges on the proposed link between specific resources,
competitive advantage and above normal profit. This implies a theory of value: the
theory must stipulate exactly how a particular resource is transformed into a value-
creating competitive advantage. However, Priem and Butler (2001) argue that the
resource-based view advances a theory of value that is tautological. A firm’s value-
add is the result of a resource-driven competitive advantage. However, resources
create this competitive advantage because they are (among other things) valuable.
While many volumes have been filled with writings on the nature of the firm,
there is surprisingly little that is of use to the empirical researcher. Geroski summa-
rizes the difficulties:
Very little in the theory of the firm as we know it is testable. Transaction cost
based theories of the firm are usually driven by factors (such as asset specificity)
which are difficult to observe, and, in any case, these theories rarely make useful
predictions about the determinants of corporate growth rates. Recent resource-
based theories of the firm have more to say about corporate growth, but the core
competencies or internal assets/skills which they are based on are also difficult to
observe. Even Penrose’s famous ‘managerial limitations to growth’ hypothesis is
based on coordination and team building costs which are rarely directly measured
and never appear on corporate balance sheets. (1999, p. i)[emphasis added]
For those who think that theories should be empirically testable, current theories of
the firm are quite unsatisfactory. The sensible conclusion is that we still have very
little understanding of why firms grow.
We now move on to theories that connect firm size with economic growth. On this
topic, the most influential thinker is undoubtedly Joseph Schumpeter (1942), who
proposed that large firms are the engines of growth. This theory, which is diamet-
rically opposed to the neoclassical perfect competition doctrine, is often called the
Schumpeterian Hypothesis. Schumpeter proposed that growth occurred mainly be-
cause of innovations – the introduction of new products, technologies, and methods
of production. However, this process required the purposeful allocation of resources
towards innovation development. Large firms, he argued, could devote proportion-
ally more resources towards innovation because their market power allowed them
to earn large monopoly profits. Thus, there should be positive returns to scale that
lead to concentrated markets dominated by large firms.7
While straightforward conceptually, the link between innovation rates and firm
size has proved remarkably difficult to test empirically. Syrneonidis (1996) reviews
7 Schumpeter also departed from neoclassical orthodoxy by asserting that large firms behaved
co-respectively so as to avoid price competition.
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the body of empirical work on this issue and notes the dispersion of both null and
significant results. Cohen and Levin note that the empirical results on this topic are
“most accurately described as fragile” (1989, p. 1078). The main difficulty has to do
with the ability to quantify ‘innovation’ – an intrinsically fuzzy concept. Different
metrics for innovation will yield wildly different results. For a good review of the
many ways of quantifying innovative intensity, see de Jong (2000).
In my view, the search for a link between firm size and innovation rates amounts
to a very narrow interpretation of the Schumpeterian Hypothesis. In practice it will
always be difficult to isolate the output of specific firms and to compare this with
their relative size. Too many variables are involved, and information is too scarce. A
more practical approach is to interpret the Schumpeterian Hypothesis more broadly.
Since large firms are theorized to be the engines of technological progress, it follows
logically that increases in market concentration should go hand in hand with growth.
Unlike the link between innovation rates and firm size, a hypothesized link between
market concentration and growth is easily tested. In Section 4.3, I test this broadly
interpreted Schumpeterian Hypothesis.
Theories of Government Size
The prolonged growth in the size of the state has been the subject of intense aca-
demic debate for at least a century. In the following discussion, I first look at the-
ories that explain government size. According to Holcombe (2005), these come
in three main varieties: budget-maximization theories, rational-choice models, and
path-dependent models. I then look at two theories that link government scale with
growth: Baumol’s cost disease and Keyne’s stimulus theory.
We begin with budget-maximization theories, such as those proposed by Niska-
nen (1974) and Brennan and Buchanan (1980). These theories assume that govern-
ment bureaucracies (or government as a whole) are self-serving entities that attempt
to maximize their budgets, but are restrained by voters and/or an institutional frame-
work such as the constitution. The viability of such an approach depends on the be-
havioral assumption that bureaucrats do indeed attempt to maximize their budget.
While maximizing behavior is one of the fundamental postulates of neoclassical the-
ory, if this is interpreted as the maximization of external payoffs (rather than internal
utility), the evidence is quite clear: humans do not behave this way. In a remarkable
study, Henrich et al. (2001) conduct a cross-cultural experiment in 16 small-scale
societies using the Ultimatum Game8. They note that “the canonical model of the
self-interested material payoff-maximizing actor is systematically violated” (2001,
p. 77). If the average individual does not seek to maximize his payoff, then there is
little reason to suspect that government bureaucrats would seek to maximize their
budgets.
8 The Ultimatum Game involves the division of a sum of money between two people. One person
initially has all the money. This person then makes an offer (to the other individual) that may
be either accepted or rejected. In the former case, the offer proceeds, while in the latter case,
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In rational-choice models (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Peltzman, 1980), gov-
ernment is not a self-interested Leviathan; rather, it reflects the preferences of cit-
izens as expressed through the democratic process. Holcome ((2005), p. 98) notes
that “the implication is that government grows because people have a preference
for larger government”. However, the general problem with this approach is that,
absent an objective measure of an individual’s internal preferences, the theory be-
comes tautological: since government is assumed to reflect public preference, the
growth of government must be the result of a preference for larger government.
The usual method for stipulating preferences is through a utility function, in
which voters are treated as utility maximizing individuals who vote in their self-
interest (for instance, Meltzer and Richard, 1981). However, Geoffrey Hodgson
argues that this is problematic: utility maximization is unfalsifiable since “utility
cannot be observed”. He continues, “utility maximization can be adapted to fit any
form of behavior, including the behavior of non-human organisms” (2012, p. 94).
For rational-choice practitioners, this is seen as a strength; from a Popperian stand-
point, this infinite adaptability is indicative of pseudo-science.
The last class of models are called path-dependent because they theorize that
government growth is the direct result of particular choices that are non-reversible.
Perhaps the best example is the ratchet hypothesis first put forward by Peacock and
Wiseman (1961). The theory is that governments grow in response to crises like wars
and depressions. While there does seem to be good evidence that government grows
during wars (especially in the US), government expansion has been a ubiquitous
phenomena in almost every country on the planet. It is hard to believe that all of this
government expansion can be attributed to economic crisis and war, especially since
the creation of large welfare states occurred mostly during the relatively peaceful
post-WWII boom.
We now move on to the relation between government size and economic growth.
Adolph Wagner (1911) hypthesized what has become known as Wagner’s law of
increasing state activity: as the economy grows, the relative size of public expendi-
ture will increase. The following question has occupied many economists’ minds:
does the expansion of government drive economic growth, or does government grow
on the back of the private economy? Keynsian theory argues for the former, while
Baumol’s cost disease argues for the latter.
In Keynsian theory, the basic idea is that government spending can be used to
stimulate growth. However, this is seen more as a tool to dampen business cycles
(and alleviate depressions) rather than as a tool for prolonged growth. The theory is
straightforward: during an economic downturn, Keynes saw the problem as one of
ineffective demand, which could be remedied by government deficit spending. Once
the crisis ended, the idea was that government spending could decrease, allowing the
repayment of public debt. While Keynsian theory asserts that government spending
both participants receive nothing. The canonical maximizing model predicts that the receiving
individual should accept any offer, since something is better than nothing. Knowing this, the person
making the offer should advance the smallest possible amount. Contrary to theory, Henrich et al
find that initial offers were, on average, no smaller than 25% of the total.
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can stimulate growth, it says very little about why there has been a prolonged ex-
pansion in the size of government.
Baumol’s cost disease, put forward by William Baumol (1967), reaches very dif-
ferent conclusions about the relation between government expansion and economic
growth. Baumol made the distinction between the goods-producing sector and the
service sector. The goods-producing sector, he argued, was characterized by rapidly
increasing labor productivity. However, the service sector was marked by mostly
stagnant labor productivity, due to its intrinsically labor-intensive nature (for in-
stance, Baumol argued that the number of musicians needed to play a Beethoven
symphony has not changed since the 19th century). Baumol argued that labor mo-
bility would lead to uniform wage growth across all sectors. Thus, while wages in
goods-producing sectors would remain tied to productivity, wages in the service
sector would become decoupled from productivity. This is Baumol’s cost disease:
persistent inflation in the price of services.
Because government primarily provides services, it follows that it should be
afflicted by this same cost disease. Thus a rise in the productivity of the goods-
producing sector should lead to a larger proportion of the national income devoted
to government. A key assumption of Baumol’s theory is that the composition of
output does not change with time (i.e. services and goods-production maintain a
constant share of real value-added). Under this assumption, it follows that increased
productivity in goods-producing sectors will lead to an increase in the employment
of the service sector, including government.
The most important aspect of this argument is that this structural change should
lead to stagnating growth. The logic is as follows: since productivity drives growth,
but the service sector cannot really increase its productivity, increases in service
employment should be detrimental to growth. Since government provides services,
Baumol’s cost disease leads to the conclusion that the scale of government should be
negatively correlated with growth. While many countries are now experiencing stag-
nating growth, attributing this to Baumol’s cost disease is problematic. For instance,
US historical data shows that the service sector has been monotonically increas-
ing in size for two centuries (see Ch. 5). If Baumol’s cost disease were true, why
is growth slowing only now? The main problem with Baumol’s approach is that it
hinges on a linear view of production. If services do not represent final output, but
instead are an input to other sectors, Baumol’s theory loses validity.
Thus, as with firms, it seems fair to conclude that the expansion of government,
and its relation to economic growth, is poorly understood. In the next section, I un-
dertake an empirical analysis that differs from all previous studies in that it focuses
on the relation between institutional size and the growth of energy throughput, not
the growth of real GDP.
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4.3 Institutional Size and the Growth of Energy Consumption:
Empirical Evidence
In order to proceed, we need metrics for both biophysical scale and institutional
scale. As in previous chapters, I continue to use energy throughput as my indicator
of the biophysical scale of the economy. However, because I engage in both interna-
tional and sub-national comparison (for which useful work data is unavailable) I use
primary energy consumption per capita (or per labor hour, when available), rather
than useful work.
There are also many possible measures of institutional scale. For instance Nitzan
and Bichler (2009) investigate the scale of large corporations in terms of both profit
and capitalization. However, this procedure does not work well when applied to the
public sector. In order to use a methodology that is applicable to both public sector
and private sector institutions, I use employment concentration (which is inspired
by Nitzan and Bichler’s concept of ‘breadth’). This approach has the advantage of
using a biophysical unit (humans), whereas other measures of institutional size rely
on monetary units.
When this methodology is applied to government, this means we express the
employment of all levels of government as a fraction of total employment. When
applied to firms, this means the fraction of total employment controlled by the top
n firms (ranked by employment, where n is an arbitrary number chosen based on
data availability). We then simply compare employment concentration and energy
consumption series and look for correlation.
We begin with corporate employment concentration on the international scale.
Figure 4.1 plots the national employment concentration of the top 10 domestic firms
against national energy consumption per capita. It reveals a rather tight correlation
across more than three orders of magnitude of corporate concentration. Figure 4.2
moves to the national scale and plots time-series of the employment concentration
of the top 200 US firms and national energy consumption per labor hour. Again, the
correlation between the two series is fairly tight.
Notice that there is an abrupt change (from growth to contraction) in both time-
series, circa 1970. Setting aside the real-world significance of this trend reversal,
it has important statistical implications because it greatly lowers the possibility of
spurious correlation. Gordon Tullock notes a problem with the least squares fitting
procedure that can produce statistical artifacts: “any curve which is substantially
smooth and reasonably monotonic has a high correlation with substantially any
other curve meeting the same characteristics” (1983, p. 419). In a world in which
many phenomena change monotonically over time, significant statistical correlation
can occur between series that are, in reality, completely unrelated. However, the fact
that corporate concentration and energy consumption both rise and fall together,
makes spurious correlation much less likely.
It could be argued that this trend reversal is the result of a change in the com-
position of the economy. Since the service sector is intrinsically less concentrated
and less energy intensive than other sectors, a general shift towards this sector could
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conceivably produce a decline in energy consumption and employment concentra-
tion. However, the data plotted in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 removes this possibility. Close
to 1973 (the first energy crunch), both the service sector and the primary and sec-
ondary sectors experienced a similar trend reversal (here, primary and secondary
sectors include industry and agriculture; the service sector includes all other sec-
tors). Again, energy consumption and corporate employment concentration remain
well-correlated.
This evidence certainly does not bode well for the neoclassical assumption that
large firms are not necessary for growth. On the other hand, it does support the
Schumpeterian Hypthothesis that large corporations are the engines of growth.
However, the problem with this latter conclusion is that we are measuring the
throughput of the entire economy, not the productivity of large firms. Thus, we can-
not necessarily say that it is large firms that are driving growth (although this seems
likely); it is conceivable that large firms are mostly growing by way of mergers and
acquisitions – accumulating smaller, more productive firms during good times and
divesting during bad times. While causation must remain ambiguous (for now), we
can conclude that corporate employment concentration is inherently connected to
the growth of energy consumption.
We now move on to the relation between government employment and energy
consumption. We look first at the international scale. Figure 4.5 plots government
employment concentration against domestic energy use per capita. The resulting
trend is less clear-cut than for large firms, but is still present, especially if we re-
move the outlying ‘low four’ nations from the regression (Moldova, Russia, Sin-
gapore, and South Korea). When we move to a time-series comparison within the
United States (Fig. 4.6) there is also clear correlation . As with corporate employ-
ment concentration, government size plateaus at nearly the same time as energy
consumption per labor hour. However, there is a large deviation during World War
II, when the US government took command of the economy. This appears as a large
pulse in employment concentration between 1941 and 1945. Interestingly, during
the war, energy use per labor hour actually declined. In keeping with the standard
practice of many growth theorists, I do not include WWII in the regression.
In contradiction to neoclassical assumptions, the evidence suggests that the size
of government is related to growth (at least, as growth is measured here). Indeed, the
evidence is quite strong in suggesting that large institutions – both public and private
– are an integral part of the biophysical growth process. Thus, we can conclude that
the neoclassical assumptions that large institutions are unimportant for growth is
insidiously untrue. But while the empirical evidence is clear, there is a distinct lack
of theory that is able to explain it.
4.4 The Importance of Hierarchy
Over the last 10,000 years, humanity’s transformation from a small-scale hunter-
gatherer species to a globe-spanning industrial civilization has been nothing short
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of remarkable. What are the organizational mechanisms that facilitated this trans-
formation? Economists typically argue that it was the price-mechanism (i.e. the
‘free market’). Prices, they argue, constitute a communication system that allows
the spontaneous emergence of organization from otherwise unrelated activity.
While I acknowledge the importance of prices, I pursue a different explanation.
Anthropological evidence suggests that hierarchy was the most important organiza-
tional element for the large societies of antiquity. Using the empirical results from
section 4.3, I hypothesize that in the modern era, nothing much has changed: hier-
archy (as embodied in large institutions) continues to form the backbone of society.
Moreover, I hypothesize that increases in hierarchy are essential for growth.
I begin by noting that a species’ ability to form social groups is, in large part, a
function of genetic inheritance. Many animals (such as bears) are incapable of form-
ing large groups, while others (such as wolves) do so naturally. All social organisms
have evolved mechanisms that maintain the cohesiveness of their groups. It appears
that in primates, this has involved the growth of large brains. In a remarkable study,
anthropologist Robin Dunbar (1992) found that the group size of different primates
was highly correlated with the relative size of their neocortex (compared to the rest
of the brain). His conclusion was that neocortex size places an upper limit on the
number of social relations that can be monitored by an individual. That is, brain
size imposes a limit on group size. From his results on non-human primates, Dun-
bar (1993) extrapolated to find that human brain size predicted a group-size limit of
about 150 (often called ‘Dunbar’s number’).
While this number should be considered exploratory, Dunbar notes that Neolithic
villages had populations in this order of magnitude. Clearly, however, humans have
evolved ways of vastly exceeding this social scale: modern cities can surpass Dun-
bar’s number by five orders of magnitude. Moreover, it appears that social com-
plexity increases in tandem with group size. In a landmark study of scaling effects
within human society, George Zipf (1949) found that the diversity of business estab-
lishments scaled with city size according to a power law relation9. Among agrarian
societies, Raoul Naroll (1956) found a scaling relation between the population of
the largest settlement and the number of occupational specialities. Similarly, Robert
Carneiro (1967) found that the organizational complexity of single-settlement soci-
eties (as measured by an index of 205 traits) scaled tightly with population.
As population increases, the evidence suggests that societies become more com-
plex. How, then, does coordination and the maintenance of social cohesion occur?
Dunbar argues that language is essential. However, while current research into the
origin of language suggests that it is more than 100,000 years old (Perreault and
Mathew, 2012), large-scale human societies (i.e. civilizations) are generally re-
garded as about 5,000 years old. John Gowdy and Lisi Krall note that after the tran-
sition to large-scale organization, “human society began to function like a single or-
ganism dedicated to the purpose of producing an economic surplus” (2013, p. 138).
The long delay between the origin of language and the transition to what Gowdy
9 A power law relation follows the formula y = axb, where a and b are constants.
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and Krall call ‘ultrasociality’ suggests that some organizational strategy other than
language has played a decisive role in increasing the complexity of human society.
Economists usually postulate that the market is responsible for modern economic
organization – that it is the exchange-facilitating price mechanism that allows large-
scale economies to spontaneously organize. While prices are undoubtedly impor-
tant, they are, in many ways, an extension of language. If language allows a mapping
of words onto an object, prices allow the mapping of an abstract quantity. To state
another way, prices allow communication in the language of mathematics. Prices
provide an ingenious mechanism for facilitating exchange, but they do not remove
the necessity for direct interpersonal contact. So long as exchange is conducted
solely by individuals, each person could conceivably transact with any other mem-
ber of the population, meaning an individual’s possible interpersonal connections
will scale with population size. However, any mechanism that allows group size to
grow well beyond Dunbar’s number must act to limit the number of interpersonal
connections. This means that it is highly unlikely that prices alone could facilitate
the extreme complexity of modern society.
Unlike prices, Turchin and Gavrilets (2009) note that hierarchical organization
allows group size to grow without a corresponding increase in the number of inter-
personal relationships. A member of a hierarchy needs to have a relationship only
with his direct superior and his direct subordinates. If the number of subordinates is
n (the span of control), then the number of direct interpersonal relationships required
by any member is at most n+1. Looking at historical agrarian empires, Turchin and
Gavrilets find a strong scaling relation between population size and the number of
administrative levels within the society (Fig. 4.7). Thus, evidence suggests that both
hierarchy and social complexity scale with population. It seems warranted to con-
clude that, at least for agrarian societies, an increase in social complexity requires
an increase in hierarchy.
But does this connection continue into the modern era? It is possible that modern
growth has somehow changed this historical relation. As noted above, the anthropo-
logical literature has mostly focused on the relation between population size, social
complexity, and hierarchy. However, my interest is in the connection between en-
ergy consumption, social complexity, and hierarchy. In order to make this connec-
tion, we begin by arguing that occupational specialization (social complexity) must
intrinsically be accompanied by an increase in energy consumption.
As occupational specialization proceeds, new products are added but older prod-
ucts do not necessarily disappear. Indeed, in many cases, new products fuel demand
for older ones. For instance, the introduction of the automobile vastly increased the
demand for steel. If the demand for these older products does not fall, but the pro-
portion of society engaged in making them does, it follows that labor productivity
in these occupations must increase. This, in turn, requires an increase in the use of
labor-augmenting technology. But, since it takes energy to make and/or fuel such
technology, we can conclude that specialization can occur only through an increase
in the per capita energy controlled by humans.
Ideally, we would be able to support this conceptual argument with direct em-
pirical data linking energy consumption with social complexity. However, because
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Fig. 4.7 Hierarchical Complexity (Number of Distinct Administrative Levels) vs. Population
of Six Historical Empires
Source: Turchin and Gavrilets (2009)
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I am not yet aware of data that would allow such a connection, we must make it
via urbanization. As noted above, the level of specialization has been found to scale
with the population of cities. Thus, it follows that levels of urbanization should
be a strong indicator of social complexity. If we can establish a link between en-
ergy consumption and urbanization, then we can indirectly establish a link between
energy consumption and social complexity . As Figure 4.8 shows, urbanization is
well-correlated with energy consumption. From this evidence, we can make the pre-
liminary assertion that as societies increase their energy consumption, they become
more complex.
But in the industrial era, does this increase in complexity still require an increase
in hierarchy as it did in the pre-industrial era? I argue that it does. In economic the-
ory (and most other social-scientific theory) public institutions (i.e. governments)
are treated quite differently from private institutions (i.e. corporations). There are
many good reasons for creating a dichotomy between the two, the most important of
which is that the primary goal of many private institutions is to make a profit, while
governments have no such clear-cut objective. Despite these obvious differences,
large institutions, whether public or private, all have remarkably similar organiza-
tional structures. Both are bureaucratic institutions, characterized by a formalized
chain of command. That is to say, they both make use of social hierarchy. Thus, I
propose that the employment concentration of such large institutions is a good mea-
sure of the overall degree of hierarchy within a society. As Figures 4.1-4.6 show,
both corporate and government employment concentration scale with energy con-
sumption.
My hypothesis, then, is that increases in energy consumption require an increase
in social complexity, which requires an increase in hierarchy. This hierarchy, in turn,
takes institutional form as either big government or big corporations. If this hypoth-
esis is correct, it provides a powerful unifying force for social-scientific theory.
4.5 Conclusions: Size Matters
Recapping our findings, we discovered that energy consumption per capita – which
I interpreted as an indicator of biophysical growth – is highly correlated with the
employment concentration of large institutions. This runs directly counter to the
neoclassical assumption that large institutions are unimportant for growth. Indeed,
if the ‘market’ of neoclassical theory is defined as exchange between individuals, we
can state that biophysical growth involves the systematic replacement of ‘market’
relationships with bureaucratic, hierarchical ones.
I argued that, while there is voluminous literature on the topic, our current un-
derstanding of large institutions is actually very limited. I’ve offered an explanation
that attempts to make the link between energy consumption, social complexity, and
hierarchy. I argue that, as complexity increases, coordination between humans must
increase. However, this coordination must be accomplished without increasing the
number of interpersonal relationships, which Dunbar argues is limited by the capac-
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ity of the human brain. Hierarchy is an essential tool for this task: it allows orga-
nizational size to increase while the number of required interpersonal relationships
remains fixed.
Lund et al. (2007) articulate the importance of hierarchy, not only among hu-
mans, but throughout the animal kingdom:
Status, prestige, esteem, honor, respect, and rank are distributed differentially
in all known groups. All human groups have social hierarchies, whether formal,
as in the military or in business settings, or informal, as in cliques or other casual
social groups.
... Social hierarchies are not unique to humans. Since the discovery of the
pecking order among hens, the status hierarchy has been considered one of the
main forms of social organization in animals. Indeed, status hierarchies are ubiq-
uitous among the closest primate relatives of humans, the chimpanzee.
Despite its ubiquity in all known human societies, hierarchy is systematically
ignored by neoclassical economics. As Nitzan and Bichler note, this has to do with
the disciplinary split between ‘economics’ and ‘politics’:
... from [Adam] Smith onward, it became increasingly customary to separate hu-
man actions into two distinct spheres, ’vertical’ and ’horizontal’. The vertical
dimension revolves around power, authority, command, manipulation and dis-
sonance. Academically, it belongs to the realm of politics. The horizontal axis
centres around well-being, free choice, exchange and equilibrium - the academic
preoccupation of economists. (2000, p. 67).
Thus, neoclassical growth theory explicitly assumes that growth is a purely ‘eco-
nomic’ phenomena that requires no centralization of power. However, all the ev-
idence presented in this chapter suggests the opposite conclusion – namely, that
growth is predicated on the increasing scope of large, hierarchical institutions.
This represents an interesting challenge to conventional economic theory, which
treats centralized power as a ‘distortion’ to its otherwise atomistic premise. Two
future theoretical paths are possible: either a purely ‘economic’ model of growth
can be made to fit reality by alluding to frequent exogenous ‘shocks’, or a model
can be developed in which hierarchy (and centralized power) plays an important
role.
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Chapter 5
Labor Structure
The neoclassical view holds that sectoral composition is a relatively
unimportant byproduct of growth.
– Cristina Echevarria (1997, p. 431)
Following the work of Allan Fisher (1935) and Colin Clark (1940), it has become
common to classify labor into three sectors: agriculture, industry, and services. Since
industrialization began, the change in the relative sizes of these sectors has been
nothing short of remarkable. As Figure 5.1 shows, between 1800 and 2010, the
United States underwent a complete demographic inversion.
Despite the ubiquity of similar transformations among other industrialized na-
tions, the canonical neoclassical model leaves no room for changes in labor de-
mographics; instead, labor is modelled as an undifferentiated mass. This chapter
investigates the empirical validity of such an approach. After investigating why
neoclassical growth theory ignores labor demographics, I briefly review theories
of structural change. I then develop a simple biophysical model of structural change
based on three simple hypotheses. Finally, I look at the empirical relation between
ServicesIndustryAgriculture
0 20 40 6080 60 40 20 80 100100 0 20 40 6080 60 40 20 80 100100
United States1800 2010
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Fig. 5.1 A Demographic Inversion
Sources: See Figure 5.10.
83
84 5 Labor Structure
labor composition and energy consumption. Unlike the assumption made by neo-
classical growth theory, the evidence suggests that labor structure is fundamentally
connected to the growth process.
5.1 Labor in Neoclassical Growth Theory
Karl Whelan observes that “since the 1950s, the Solow-Ramsey1 model of economic
growth, which models all output in the economy in terms of a single aggregate pro-
duction function, has been the canonical model of how the macroeconomy evolves
in the long run” (2000, p. 1). By adopting a single sector model in which labor is
treated as a homogeneous entity, the following assumption is implicit:
Labor Structure Assumption:
Changes in labor structure are not important for growth.
To be clear, in this chapter I test the assumptions made by the one-sector neo-
classical model, not the opinions or assumptions of those who apply the model. The
Solow-Swan model is explicit that only the quantity of labor input matters. However,
some applied economists have attempted to adjust this labor quantity by accounting
for changes in labor quality. For instance Denison (1962) and Schwartzman (1968)
adjust the quantity of labor to account for changes in education. Perry (1971) ad-
justs for changes in the age-sex composition of the labor force, while Chinloy (1980)
measures how sex, age, class, occupation and education contribute to labor quality.
Unfortunately, measuring the quality of labor requires making inherently subjec-
tive decisions (as do all measures of quality). In the literature referenced above, a
worker’s labor quality is defined in terms of his relative productivity. But herein lies
the problem: the canonical approach is to use relative wages as a proxy for relative
productivity (Perry et al, 1971). By doing so, researchers are explicitly assuming that
neoclassical distribution theory is true – that “wage rates should measure marginal
productivities” (Baily, 1981, p. 8). Thus, by testing neoclassical growth theory using
quality-adjusted labor inputs, one uses metrics that are circularly dependent on the
theory being tested.
Furthermore, it is not clear that adjusting for differences in labor quality is ad-
missible if the internal consistency of neoclassical theory is to be maintained. Ag-
gregate production functions are supposed to represent the sum of all firm-specific
production functions. However, Felipe and Fisher note that such aggregation is only
theoretically permissible if one assumes that labor is homogeneous:
In the simplest case of constant returns, a labor aggregate will exist if and only
if a given set of relative wages induces all firms to employ different labor in the
same proportion ... The implication of these conditions is that the existence of a
labor aggregate requires the absence of specialization in employment ... (2003, p.
236)[emphasis added]
1 The Solow-Ramsey model is similar to the Solow-Swan model. The former modifies the latter
by introducing consumer optimization (i.e. utility functions).
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By undertaking labor quality adjustments, one implicitly assumes that specialization
of labor is important. However, Felipe and Fisher’s aggregation conditions permit
no specialization of labor. Thus, if neoclassical growth theory is to remain internally
consistent, labor quality adjustments should not be used.
I should also note that while the one-sector model is canonical, some neoclassi-
cal economists have used multi-sector models to explain changes in labor structure.
For instance, economists such as Echevarria (1997), Whelan (2003), Ngai and Pis-
sarides (2004), and Foellmi and Zweimller (2008) have all used such multi-sector
models to investigate structural change. Thus, the assumption that labor structure is
unimportant does not apply to these models.
In fact, the empirical results of such models are often quite good. However, the
ability to fit data, while important, is not the only criteria upon which a model must
be judged. As Wassily Leontief notes, “what is really needed, in most cases, is a
very difficult and seldom very neat assessment and verification of these assump-
tions in terms of observed facts (1971, p. 2)”. The problem with the multi-sector
models discussed above is that they begin with assumptions that, while plausible,
are untestable.
There are two basic approaches to modelling structural change. The first ap-
proach is endow the population with a utility function in which the preference for
agricultural, industrial, and service commodities changes as a function of income
(Echevarria, 1997). The problem with this approach, however, is that utility func-
tions cannot be observed, and are therefore unfalsifiable. Because of this, empirical
success should be expected, since, as Hodgson notes, “we know in advance that any
behaviour can fit [utilitarian] theory” (2012, p. 104). The second approach is to as-
sume differences in technological progress between sectors (for instance, Ngai and
Pissarides, 2004). However, since the technological progress term cannot be mea-
sured independently of the neoclassical model, this approach is also unfalsifiable.
Thus, there exists considerable heterogeneity among neoclassical economists on
the topic of structural change. However, to the extent that the one-sector model
remains dominant, it seems fair to state that labor structure change plays no part in
neoclassical theory.
5.2 Theories of Labor Structure Change
Many schools of labor transformation exist. For brevity, I review only three. In
order of historical precedent, these are: the demand-side, the supply-side, and the
metabolic approach. I review the basic tenets of each theory below.
We begin with the demand-side approach, which is rooted in the hypothesis of
a hierarchy of human needs. In the mid-19th century, Ernst Engel (1857) noticed
that the portion of income spent on food tended to fall as income rose. He surmised
that when the desire for food is satiated, individuals move on to more sophisticated
needs. In the 20th century, Alan Fisher (1935) and Colin Clark (1940) extended this
hypothesis to the industrial sector. They argued that the desire for consumer goods
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would become satiated, at which point people would switch to a desire for services.
In economic jargon, the basic hypothesis of the demand-side approach is that the
‘income elasticity of demand’ for goods is less than one (meaning the proportion of
income spent on goods falls as income rises), while the income elasticity of demand
for services is greater than one (meaning the proportion of income spent on services
increases as income rises). Thus the portion of income devoted to services tends to
grow with income. As demand changes, so too should the sectoral composition of
employment.
In contrast, the supply-side approach, advanced by William Baumol (1967), fo-
cuses on differences in the growth of labor productivity between sectors. While the
goods-producing sector rapidly increases its labor productivity, the service sector –
due to its inherently labor-intensive nature – increases its labor productivity much
more slowly. Baumol assumed that the structure of final output remains constant
(ie: the inter-sectoral ratio of ‘real’ output is fixed). Under this assumption, it fol-
lows that increases in the productivity of the goods-producing sector will lead to a
decline in its employment share, while lagging productivity growth will yield an in-
crease in service employment share. A major prediction of the supply-side approach
is that the swelling of the low-productivity service sector should cause economic
growth to slow. However, historical data show that the US service sector has been
growing monotonically for more than two centuries (Fig. 5.7). Given this historical
expansion, Baumol’s approach must explain why it is only recently that growth has
slowed.
Agriculture
Industry
Service
Household
Fig. 5.2 Linear Treatment of the Economy
A shortcoming of both supply and demand-side approaches is that they adopt a
simplistic, linear representation of the economy (Fig. 5.2). In both cases, only final
consumption by households is considered. The problem, however, is that actual con-
sumption patterns are much more complex: each sector consumes a portion of both
its own output and the output of all other sectors. This means that a major fraction
of the output of each sector is not destined for final consumption by households,
but rather for inter-sectoral consumption. Thus, focusing only on final demand is
misleading. Within supply-side literature, this realization has led to a refocus on
producer services – services aimed at business rather than consumers (Greenfield,
1966; Francois, 1990; Greenhalgh and Gregory, 2001) .
Another shortcoming of both supply and demand-side approaches is that they
focus only on production and ignore the importance of consumption. The metabolic
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approach advanced by Giampietro, Mayumi, and Sorman (2012) attempts to correct
this deficiency. Giampietro et al. credit George Zipf (1941) for first emphasizing the
importance of consumption capacity:
“Zipf proposed a basic principle of socio-economic development: if an economy
wants to be able to produce more, it has to invest more in consuming. This prin-
ciple implies that socio-economic development must be based on achieving an
internal balance between parallel investments both of human activity and of en-
ergy over the two compartments of production and consumption ...” (Giampietro
et al., 2012, p. 157)
Building on the work of Eigen (1971) and Ulanowicz (1986), Giampietro et al.
divide the economy into two compartments: the hypercycle and the dissipative cycle
(Fig. 5.3). The hypercycle produces all of the material goods used by a society
(including energy). The ‘hyper’ portion of ‘hypercycle’ refers to the fact that this
sector produces a surplus of material goods. Thus, the energy sector produces more
energy than it requires for its own purposes. If it did not, all of society would be
engaged in energy harvesting activities.
This energetic surplus is used by all other sectors, including sectors within the
hypercycle. The dissipative cycle, on the other hand, does not produce any material
goods. Instead, it dissipates (a fancy word for ‘consumes’) the surplus of the hy-
percycle. In return, the dissipative cycle provides crucial facilitation activity to the
hypercycle. A basic hypothesis of this approach is that such facilitation activity is
essential to the proper functioning of the hypercycle. The important insight of Gi-
ampietro et al. is to place the service sector inside the dissipative cycle. Thus, the
role of the service sector (and the household) is to both facilitate the activities of the
hypercycle and consume its surplus.2
Agriculture Industry Services Household
Energy & Material
Surplus
Dissipative CycleHypercycle
Facilitation
Fig. 5.3 Hypercyclic and Dissipative Compartments of Society
Modelled after Giampietro et al. (2012). The hypercycle produces all the material needs of so-
ciety. The material surplus from the hypercycle is dissipated by the dissipative cycle. In return,
the dissipative cycle provides facilitation activity that is required for the proper functioning of the
hypercycle.
2 The distinction between productive and unproductive labor is a long-running feature of Marxian
political economy. For instance, Baran and Sweezy (1966) treat the service sector as unproductive,
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The other main insight of the metabolic approach is its focus on the internal con-
sumption of the hypercycle. In general, labor productivity gains will require greater
amounts of hypercyclic energy and resource consumption. Thus, as human activity
is transferred to the dissipative cycle, we can expect energy consumption to increase.
In the following sections, I develop a biophysical model of structural change that
builds on the metabolic approach proposed by Giampietro et al.
5.3 Three Hypotheses
I contend that changes in labor composition can be explained using the following
three hypotheses that build on the work of Giampietro et al. (2012; 2013), Cleveland
et al. (1984), Hall et al. (1986), and other biophysical scholars who have insisted on
placing energy at the center of analysis. Below, I explain the rationale behind each
hypothesis and present supporting evidence.
1. All sectors attempt to increase their labor productivity.
Among economists there is virtually unanimous recognition that the cost reduc-
tion imperative prompts firms to decrease their labor costs by increasing labor pro-
ductivity. It is important to note that this impetus exists only so long as machine
work is cheaper than employing human labor. This has been the case historically
because exosomatic energy (primarily fossil fuel) was cheap. It may not be the case
in the future.
2. Productivity increases require an increase in energy consumption.
This follows from thermodynamic principles: increases in labor productivity are
accomplished primarily by substituting exosomatic for endosomatic work (non-
human for human). This implies that labor productivity and energy consumption are
fundamentally connected. For most sectors, this concept is difficult to test. Because
sectoral output is generally heterogeneous and changes qualitatively with time, the
quantity of output is usually calculated by deflating the nominal value of output by
an average price index. However, this approach is subject to all the price index prob-
lems discussed in Section 2.4. What we want is a physical measure of output that
is not derived from prices. Fortunately the oil and gas sector is amenable to such
an approach because its output is energy. Figure 5.4 plots the physical labor pro-
ductivity of the oil and gas sector (energy output per worker) relative to its energy
use per worker. As expected, the two series are tightly coupled, lending support to
Hypothesis 2. Correlation between energy consumption and productivity has also
been found by Cleveland et al. (1984) and by Hall et al. (1986).
and hence, dissipative. For the present discussion, I do not use the Marxian language of ‘unproduc-
tive’ because it implies that this labor is unnecessary. As Giampietro et al. note, dissipative activity
is equally as important as hypercyclic activity.
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Fig. 5.4 Biophysical Labor Productivity and Energy Use per Worker in the Oil & Gas Sector
Sources: US oil and gas production from HSUS Table Db157-158 (1919-1948) and EIA Table 1.3
(1949-2007). Direct energy consumption for the oil and gas sector from Guilford et al. (2011),
Table 6. Oil and gas employment from 1958 and 1972 Census of Mineral Industries (1919-1972).
Oil and gas employment is calculated indirectly as the difference between total employment of
mineral industries and employment excluding oil and gas industries. Employment from 1972-2007
from BLS series CES1021100001 (1972-2007).
3. Increases in energy consumption require an increase in facilitation activity.
Here I use Douglass North’s (1990) proposed distinction between transformation
activity and transaction activity (a distinction adopted by Giampietro et al., 2012).
However, I refer to the latter category as facilitation activity, since I wish to dis-
associate from Coasian transaction cost theory. Transformation activities are those
that are directly involved with manipulating material and energy, while facilitation
activities are those that are indirectly involved, but still crucial for the production
process as a whole. In general, agriculture and industry are classified as transforma-
tion activities, while service and household work is considered facilitation.
Increasing energy consumption (in order to increase productivity) does not occur
through a simple scaling of the existing state of affairs. As I attempted to demon-
strate in Section 4.4, the growth of energy consumption entails an increase in the
complexity of the economic system. Alongside this complexity comes an increasing
need for occupational specialization. My hypothesis is that as energy consumption
expands, facilitation activities must expand faster than transformation activities.
For an example of this process, take productivity increases in agriculture that are
due to the increased use of tractors. Such productivity increases will be accompa-
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nied by an increase in agricultural energy consumption per worker, because tractors
require energy to function. Since workers are required to build the tractors, indus-
trial employment must also expand. Furthermore, a myriad of facilitation activities
are required to support the use of tractors. For instance, mechanics will be required
to service the tractors. Truck drivers will be required to transport both finished trac-
tors and all of the ancillary products required to make the tractors. Engineers will be
required to design the tractors. Educators will be required to train the skilled labor
involved in designing, making, and servicing tractors. Government may be required
to regulate the tractor industry. Banks are required to finance both the purchase of
tractors by farmers, and the purchase of plant equipment by tractor manufacturers.
The list of ancillary activity required to augment agricultural productivity is im-
mense.
For the moment, we leave aside the question of why energy consumption in-
creases might require a relative rise in facilitation activity (I do not have a satisfac-
tory answer to this question). The more pertinent question is: how can we measure
such activity without resorting to a ‘network tautology’? Note that for any given
service sector activity, one can always demonstrate that this activity is ‘required’ for
hypercyclic productivity growth. Taken to the point of the absurd, suppose we have
a hairdresser who cuts the hair of a massage therapist, who gives a massage to an
educator, who trains a secretary, who works for an engineer who designs tractors.
We can say, without too much of a stretch, that this hairdresser is required if trac-
tors are to be used in agriculture. I defy anyone to find a facilitation activity that
cannot somehow be connected to a hypercyclic activity. The problem is that this is
true by definition of the fact that modern societies are well-connected networks in
which almost no one lives in isolation. Thus any individual (or process) can easily
be linked to any other individual (or process), so long as we allow enough degrees
of separation.
By definition of their mutual existence in a networked society, most of the service
sector is required for the hypercycle to function, and vice versa. But this is tautolog-
ically true, and therefore unsatisfactory. In order to test Hypothesis 3 (increases in
energy consumption require an increase in facilitation activity) in a non-tautological
manner, we must restrict the degree of separation between facilitation and transfor-
mation activity. As the degree of separation grows, we will asymptotically approach
the network tautology. Therefore, the smaller the degree of separation, the better. It
follows that the best possible test of Hypothesis 3 is to restrict analysis to one degree
of separation – facilitation activity that has been internalized by the hypercycle.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics makes a distinction between ‘production’ and
‘non-production’ workers. The former are those who are directly involved with pro-
duction (i.e. mechanics), while the latter are only indirectly involved (i.e. secre-
taries).3 Thus, non-production employment represents the most direct form of fa-
cilitation activity. If Hypothsis 3 is true, we expect that increases in hypercyclic
energy consumption (per worker) should lead to an increase in the proportion of
non-production employment (in the hypercycle).
Since data on non-production employment is available only for non-farm work-
ers, we must restrict analysis to industry (instead of the entire hypercycle). Figure
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Fig. 5.5 Internal Facilitation Activity and Energy Use per Worker in Industry
Sources: Note that ‘Industry’ is taken to be equivalent to the BLS ‘goods-producing sector’. To-
tal employment and production-worker employment of goods-producing sector from BLS (se-
ries CES0600000001 and CES0600000006 respectively). Industrial energy consumption data from
EIA Table 2.1, Energy Consumption by Sector.
5.5 plots the energy use per labor hour of US industry against the employment of
non-production workers in industry (as a fraction of total industrial employment).
The connection between the two series is clear: as we subsidize production work-
ers with more energy, we increase the productivity of each worker. This process
increases the material surplus, which allows more ancillary workers. However, I
argue that causation is not linear: increasing productivity both allows and requires
more ancillary activity. Issues of causation aside, the results from Figure 5.5 provide
strong supporting evidence for Hypothesis 3.
3 According to the BLS: “Production and related employees include working supervisors and all
nonsupervisory employees (including group leaders and trainees) engaged in fabricating, process-
ing, assembling, inspecting, receiving, storing, handling, packing, warehousing, shipping, trucking,
hauling, maintenance, repair, janitorial, guard services, product development, auxiliary production
for plants own use (for example, power plant), recordkeeping, and other services closely associ-
ated with the above production operations” (BLS, 2009, Ch. 2, p. 2). Non-production employees
include everyone else.
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5.4 Modelling Changes in Labor Structure
The three hypotheses outlined above can be used to create a simple, biophysical
model of labor structure change. The model that I develop below uses only four
exogenous, biophysical inputs: total population, agricultural productivity (proxied
by wheat productivity), domestic fossil fuel output (or domestic energy consumption
after 1949), and mining sector biophysical labor productivity (fossil fuel output per
worker). All exogenous inputs come from historical data. Furthermore, the model
contains only three parameters. Despite its simplicity, this model is able to reproduce
historical trends with surprising accuracy.
I derive the model’s basic equation from a mathematical identity: the labor (L)
required for any activity is equal to the quantity of output (Q) times the labor per
unit of output (note that even if we cannot measure output, this equation is true by
definition):
L = Q · L
Q
(5.1)
Since L/Q is the inverse of labor productivity (ρ), we can rewrite equation 5.1 as:
L =
Q
ρ
(5.2)
However, we want an equation for the growth rate of labor. Taking the derivative
of equation 5.2 and expressing the result in terms of growth rates gives the following
equation:4
Lˆ = Qˆ− ρˆ (5.3)
This is the basic equation of ‘motion’ for our model. It tells us that output growth
represents a centripetal force that increases the growth of labor requirements. On the
other hand, labor productivity growth represents a centrifugal force that decreases
the growth of labor requirements. Given initial conditions (i.e. initial employment
in each sector), equation 5.3 can be used to model changes in sectoral employment.
We begin with the agricultural sector. For simplicity, we assume that there is
no net agricultural trade. Under this assumption, we can state that the demand for
agricultural output is largely a function of total population, since per capita nutri-
tional and caloric needs are mostly fixed. We ignore any changes in food preferences
and/or total caloric intake that occurs with income, and we ignore any conversion of
crops into biofuels.
4 Note that I use the convention of hat calculus where ( ˆ ) denotes growth rate. In hat calculus, the
growth rate of a function (y) is defined as the first derivative (y′) divided by the original function:
yˆ = y′/y. The product rule becomes a sum (xˆy = xˆ+ yˆ) and the quotient rule becomes a difference
( xˆy = xˆ− yˆ).
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Under these assumptions, the growth rate of agricultural output (QˆAG) is con-
strained by the historical growth rate of total population (PˆT ).5 For simplicity, we
assume that agricultural labor productivity is proportional to historical wheat pro-
ductivity (ρwheat ), and that this proportionality is dictated by the constant ψ .6 The
resulting formula for the agricultural employment growth rate is given by equation
5.4. The value ψ = 0.71 reproduces historical agricultural employment to an accu-
racy of R2 = 0.95 (see Fig. 5.7). If the model’s assumptions are valid, this indicates
that the productivity of the whole agricultural sector grew 71% as quickly as wheat
productivity.
LˆAG = PˆT −ψρˆwheat (5.4)
We now move on to industry. Again, industrial employment growth is given by
the following equation:
LˆIN = QˆIN− ρˆIN (5.5)
Recall that according to Hypothesis 2, labor productivity is proportional to energy
use per worker. A corollary of this hypothesis is that output is proportional to energy
consumption. We can show this by noting that labor productivity is simply output
per worker. Thus, we can write equation 5.6. Since the denominators on the left
and right side are equivalent, if Hypothesis 2 holds, we know that energy consump-
tion is proportional to output. Another way of thinking about this is that output is
constrained by energy consumption.
output
number of workers
∝
energy use
number of workers
(5.6)
Thus, from Hypothesis 2, we assume that the output of industry is constrained
by its ability to consume energy, and that this constraint is governed by the constant
σ . Assuming a closed economy in which fossil fuel energy dominates, the energy
available to industry is equal to the fossil fuel output of the mining sector (QM) times
the fraction of this output consumed by industry ( fIN):
QIN = σ ·QM · fIN (5.7)
We take the derivative of equation 5.7. Since σ is constant, it disappears, leaving
only the following relation:
QˆIN = QˆM + fˆIN (5.8)
5 Because we are modelling agriculture employment, we take total population as a given. When I
say population ‘constrains’ agricultural output, the reverse is also true – agricultural output growth
constrains total population growth. Thus, we simply assume a coupled relation and leave aside
issues of causation.
6 Ideally we would link agricultural productivity back to agricultural energy consumption. How-
ever, I leave such an endeavor for future work.
94 5 Labor Structure
This equation states that the industrial output growth rate is equal to the domestic
fossil fuel output growth rate plus the rate of change of industry’s share of energy
consumption. Data for industry’s share of energy consumption is available only from
1949 onward, and it shows that the industrial energy share has declined slowly over
the last 60 years (data is from EIA Table 2.1). Between 1949 and 2000, the average
annual change in the industrial energy share was −0.53%. This is more than four
times smaller than the 2.2% average annual change in total energy consumption
during the same period. In order to maintain simplicity, I make the ‘not quite true’
assumption that industrial energy share is approximately constant. Thus, its rate of
change is approximately zero ( fˆIN ≈ 0), meaning the growth rate of industrial output
is approximately equal to the growth rate of fossil fuel output:
QˆIN ≈ QˆM (5.9)
Since the only available biophysical productivity data comes from the mining sector,
we assume that industrial labor productivity is proportional to the biophysical labor
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Fig. 5.6 Growth rates of Output and Labor Productivity of the Mining industry
Sources: Fossil fuel production data from HSUS Table Db155 (1920-1948) & EIA Annual Energy
Review 2011, Table 1.2 (1949-2011). Mining sector employment from HSUS Table Ba819 (1900-
1910), HSUS Table Ba841(1920-1957), & BLS CEU1021000001 (1958-2011).
QˆM = −0.0588t +118
ρˆM = −0.0179t +37.6
Table 5.1 Regressions for the Output and Productivity Growth Rates of the Mining Sector
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productivity of the mining sector (ρˆM , fossil fuel output per worker), and that this
proportionality is dictated by the constant λ . Under this assumption, the equation
for the employment growth rate of industry becomes:
LˆIN = QˆM−λρˆM (5.10)
Figure 5.6 plots the historical growth rates of fossil fuel output and mining sector
biophysical labor productivity. Regressions for these two series are shown in Table
5.1. Note that the model uses regression data rather than raw historical data. The
value of λ = 1.15 reproduces 19th and early 20th century industrial employment
quite accurately (see Fig. 5.7, upper right). According to the model, this means that
the labor productivity of industry grew 15% faster than the mining sector produc-
tivity (although such an interpretation depends on the validity of all model assump-
tions). After 1940, however, the model diverges rapidly from historical data. There
are two factors that are likely at play in this divergence. Firstly, the assumption that
industrial output is constrained by domestic fossil fuel production is no longer valid
after 1960, as the US became a major energy importer from this point onward. Sec-
ondly, it seems likely that the parameter value λ = 1.15 is no longer valid after
1940 (meaning the industrial labor productivity growth rate changed relative to the
mining productivity growth rate). This means that we need to recalibrate our model.
To gain more insight into the post-WWII period, we reset our model to the initial
year 1949 (when reliable annual energy consumption data becomes available). We
now constrain the industrial output growth rate by the societal energy consumption
growth rate (Eˆ), rather than the fossil fuel production growth rate. Furthermore,
since we have access to accurate data, we use raw data for the historical energy
growth rate, rather than a regression. Our function for industrial employment growth
is now given by equation 5.11. This time λ = 0.68 reproduces post-1949 industrial
employment fairly accurately (Fig. 5.7, lower right). Assuming the validity of the
model, this means that from 1949 onward, industrial productivity grew 68% as fast
as mining productivity. Notice that cyclical fluctuations are reproduced – a very
desirable feature that is perhaps surprising, given the simplicity of our model. Since
our energy data is the source of these fluctuations, it gives us an indication that we
are on the right track.
LˆIN = Eˆ−λρˆM (5.11)
We now move on to the service sector. Again, our basic equation is given by
equation 5.12.
Lˆs = QˆS− ρˆS (5.12)
Hypotheses 2 and 3 (productivity increases require an increase in energy use, which
requires an increase in facilitation activity) imply that an increase in the produc-
tivity of the hypercycle requires an increase in facilitation activity. We tested this
prediction by looking at the growth of facilitation activity within the hypercycle it-
self (Fig. 5.5). We now broaden this finding to assume that increases in hypercyclic
96 5 Labor Structure
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050
R2 = 0.98
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
R2 = 0.71
R2 = 0.99
1800 - 1930
R2 = 0.95
Constrained by
domestic fossil fuel
production
Constrained by domestic
energy consumption
Historical
Model
Historical
Model
Historical
Model
Historical
Model
Agriculture Industry
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t (
M
ill
io
ns
)
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t (
M
ill
io
ns
)
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t (
M
ill
io
ns
)
Services
Industry
Enlarged Below
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t (
M
ill
io
ns
)
Blair Fix
Fig. 5.7 Historical Employment in Agriculture, Industry, and Services and Modeled Results
Sources: Employment data for 1800-1910 from HSUS Table Ba814-830. Non-agriculture employ-
ment data for 1920-2000 from HSUS Table Ba840-848. Agriculture employment data for 1920-
1990 from HSUS Table Ba472; 1990-2000 from HSUS Table Ba482. Employment data for 2001-
2010 from BEA Table 6.5D. US energy consumption from EIA Table 1.3. Total population from
Maddison 2008. Wheat productivity is from HSUS Table Da1148. Industry includes results with
and without imported energy.
productivity require a general rise in facilitation activity across all of society. Thus,
we assume that the demand for services (i.e. service ‘output’) is proportional to the
productivity of the hypercycle (ρHY P), and that this proportionality is dictated by
the constant γ:
QˆS = γ · ρˆHY P. (5.13)
Furthermore, we assume that portions of the service sector (i.e. transportation)
can increase their productivity, but that these productivity increases require a cor-
responding increase in facilitation activity. For instance, increases in transportation
productivity may be the result of better infrastructure. However, a myriad of ad-
ditional facilitation activity is required to design and maintain this infrastructure.
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Since all paid facilitation activity is contained within the service sector, productivity
gains within this sector tend to be offset by a corresponding increase in a differ-
ent facilitation activity. For simplicity, we assume that this process is ‘zero sum’,
meaning productivity gains are exactly offset by increased facilitation activity. Un-
der this assumption, service sector productivity is constant, thus its growth rate is
zero (ρˆS = 0). Our equation for service sector employment growth becomes:
LˆS = γ · ρˆHY P (5.14)
Since we want all exogenous inputs to the model to be biophysical, we proxy
hypercycle productivity in terms of the biophysical productivity of the mining sector
(ρM , fossil fuel output per worker). This yields equation 5.15. Note that we use
the mining productivity regression, rather than raw historical data. The parameter
value γ = 0.86 allows us to fit historical service employment with an accuracy of
R2 = 0.98 (see Fig. 5.7).
LˆS = γ · ρˆM (5.15)
Having built a simple biophysical model that reproduces historical data, the im-
portant thing is to decide what the model means. In industry and agriculture, there
are two basic components to the model. The first component is a constraint on out-
put growth. In agriculture, the constraint is the food consuming ability of the total
population. In industry, the constraint is total energy production/consumption. The
second component is productivity growth. The dynamic of the model is produced
by the interaction between the centripetal employment force of output growth and
the centrifugal employment force of productivity growth. Both output growth and
productivity growth are exogenous to the model, but use inputs of historical, bio-
physical data. In the service sector, the dynamic is simpler: the growth of service
sector employment is proportional to the productivity growth of the hypercycle. The
model shows that the simple dynamic between output constraints and productivity
increases can account for most of the historical structural change in the US over the
last two centuries.
The purpose for building this model is to understand how energy consumption
is related to labor structure change. We can do this by returning to our initial hy-
potheses. According to Hypothesis 1, all sectors attempt to increase their labor pro-
ductivity. According to Hypothesis 2, such increases require an increase in energy
consumption per labor hour. Assuming all sectors (except services) increase their
productivity, we can expect such productivity gains to lead to an overall increase in
the per capita energy consumption of the entire society.
Thus, as an approximation, we can state that the productivity growth rate (for any
given sector) is a function of the growth rate of societal energy use per capita (Eˆpc),
and that this functional relation is governed by the parameter µ . This parameter
need not be constant (it could be a function of time) but it must remain positive,
since we assume that productivity and societal energy consumption per capita are
always positively correlated. Thus for any non-service sector x, we can write:
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ρˆx = µxEˆx (5.16)
We can use this relation to understand how our model relates to societal energy
consumption. We begin in agriculture. Assuming that ρˆAG = µAGEˆpc, we can rewrite
equation 5.4 by replacing the agricultural productivity growth rate with a function
of the societal energy use per capita growth rate:
LˆAG = PˆT −µAGEˆpc (5.17)
Rearranging for energy use per capita gives:
Eˆpc =
PˆT − LˆAG
µAG
(5.18)
Since µAG is always positive, a consequence of equation 5.18 is that when the total
population growth rate (PˆT ) exceeds the growth rate of employment in the agricul-
tural sector (LˆAG), the growth rate of societal energy use per capita will be positive.
To state this result a different way, a positive per capita energy growth rate (for all of
society) should be accompanied by a decline in the size of agricultural employment
relative to the size of the total population. Thus, we expect that societal energy use
per capita should be negatively correlated with the relative size of the agricultural
sector.
Next, we turn to the service sector. The growth rate of service employment is
dictated by the growth rate of hypercyclic productivity. Again, we assume that the
hypercyclic productivity growth rate can be written as a function of societal energy
use per capita (ρˆHY P = µHY PEˆpc). Substituting this function into equation 5.14 gives
the following rather direct relation:
Eˆpc =
LˆS
µHY P
(5.19)
Since µHY P is always positive, increases in service employment should be positively
correlated with increases in per capita energy consumption. Of course, this was the
basis of hypothesis three, so our model is just reflecting our underlying hypothesis
that increases in energy consumption require an increase in facilitation activity.
Lastly, we come to industry. Curiously, despite the fact that industry is the most
energy-intensive sector, the relation between industrial employment and societal en-
ergy consumption is rather complex. Again we assume that the growth rate of in-
dustrial productivity is a function of societal energy use per capita (ρˆIN = µIN Eˆpc).
Substituting this relation into equation 5.5 gives:
µIN Eˆpc = QˆIN− LˆIN (5.20)
However, in our model, we assumed that the industrial output growth rate was
equal to the total (societal) energy consumption growth rate (QˆIN = Eˆ). Therefore,
we substitute this into equation 5.20. Notice also that societal energy consump-
tion per capita is defined as total energy consumption divided by total population
(Epc = E/PT ). Therefore, the growth rate of societal energy use per capita is equal
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to the growth rate of energy minus the growth rate of population (Eˆpc = Eˆ − PˆT ).
Substituting this into equation 5.20 gives:
µIN(Eˆ− PˆT ) = Eˆ− LˆIN (5.21)
This can be rearranged into the following form:
Eˆ(µIN−1) = µAGPˆT − LˆIN (5.22)
Interestingly, under the special condition that µIN = 1, this equation collapses to
Lˆ = PˆT . What does this mean? Under the condition that the growth rate of indus-
trial productivity is exactly equal to the growth rate of societal energy use per capita,
industrial employment grows at the same pace as total population. Under this condi-
tion, any increase in society’s per capita consumption of industrial goods is exactly
offset by increases in industrial labor productivity. Thus, the industrial sector need
only maintain its share of employment.
This also leads to the unexpected result that the relative size of industry can
become independent of energy consumption. Under such a condition, there will be
no trend between energy consumption and the employment share of industry. Since
industry is by far the most energy-intensive sector, this result is counter-intuitive.
Common sense leads to the conclusion that industrial employment share should be
positively correlated with societal energy consumption.
The model developed above allows us to make two key predictions about the
relation between per capita energy consumption and changes in labor structure:
1. Agriculture employment share should be negatively correlated with energy
use per capita.
2. Service employment share should be positively correlated with energy use
per capita.
Furthermore, we can state that there is the possibility that the industrial employment
share may have no trend with energy consumption.
5.5 Labor Structure and Energy: Empirical Evidence
We begin by noting that international trade makes it very difficult to conduct analysis
of sectoral composition at the national level. One can never quite be sure how trade
is affecting one’s results. For instance work by Gierlinger and Krausmann (2012)
and Giljum and Hubacek (2001) has shown that both the United States and Europe
now have major mass-balance deficits (they import more mass than they export).
Thus, any conclusions drawn on the national level may rest on dubious grounds,
since domestic sectors may be proportionately larger/smaller than would otherwise
be possible in a closed system.
For this reason, we begin our empirical analysis at the scale of the global econ-
omy, the only truly closed economy on the planet. In a sense, results garnered at
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Fig. 5.8 Global Employment Share of Agriculture, Industry and Services vs. Global Energy
Consumption per capita
Note: No causation is implied by the choice of y and x-axes variables. Sources: All data em-
ployment data from World Bank Development Indicators, data series SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS (Agri-
culture Share), SL.IND.EMPL.ZS (Industry Share), SL.SRV.EMPL.ZS (Service Share), and
SP.POP.TOTL (National Population). Global sector shares are the average of all national shares,
weighted by each nation’s share of world population. Global energy consumption from BP Statis-
tical Review 2013.
this level are the most incorruptible, since one can never say that a trade imbalance
distorted one’s data. Figure 5.8 plots the sector composition of the entire global
economy against global energy consumption per capita. Global sector composition
is calculated by a weighted average of all nations, where the sector composition of
each nation is weighted by its total population.
The results are consistent with the predictions made by our biophysical model:
increases in per capita energy consumption are associated with an increase in the
service share of employment and a decrease in the agricultural share of employment.
What is surprising, however, is that industrial employment share has virtually no
trend with global energy consumption. In our model, this was predicted to occur
under the stringent condition that the industrial productivity growth rate was exactly
equal to the growth rate of societal energy use per capita. Thus, what was a possible,
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but improbable scenario in our model turns out to be a rather robust feature of the
global economy.
We turn now to a cross-sectional analysis of the global economy in the year
2008. We plot the agricultural, industrial, and service employment share of each na-
tion against national energy consumption per capita. By doing so, we are able to see
how the per capita energy consumption of each nation relates to its sectoral compo-
sition (Fig: 5.9). Again, the results are consistent with our predictions: agricultural
employment share is negatively correlated with energy consumption, while service
employment share shows a positive correlation. Interestingly, the relation between
industrial employment and energy use is extremely muddy. It does seem to resemble
an inverted U-shape, but the correlation is very low. It is quite plausible that trade
imbalances have influenced the shape of this curve.
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Lastly, we move to a time-series comparison at the national level. Figure 5.10
plots US sectoral composition against national useful work consumption per capita.
Again, the results are consistent with our predictions: agriculture employment is
negatively correlated with useful work, while the service sector is positively corre-
lated. As with the global level, we find that for much of the period in question, US
industrial employment share had essentially no trend with per capita useful work
consumption.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from this data. Firstly, if we accept
energy consumption as a metric for biophysical scale, then it follows that growth
and sector composition are fundamentally related, contrary to assumptions made by
neoclassical growth theory. Secondly, these results contradict the common assertion
that a transition to a service economy will lead to the use of fewer resources (Jack-
son, 1996; Stahel, 1997). Since the service sector has a lower resource intensity than
the industrial sector, the argument is that increasing the service composition of the
economy should lead to the use of fewer resources. The evidence, however, suggests
that the exact opposite is true: long-term increases in service sector size lead to an
increase in energy consumption.
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As is clear in our biophysical model, the problem with trying to dematerialize
through service expansion is that the service sector is not functionally viable on its
own. It is the dissipation and facilitation component of an industrial economy. Thus,
a large service sector must be supported by a highly productive industrial sector,
and such productivity inherently requires vast inputs of energy and resources. It
is interesting to note that the only energy reduction pathway that is supported by
empirical evidence is a return to an agrarian economy.
5.6 Conclusions: Labor Structure Matters
The implicit assumption built into the one-sector neoclassical growth model is that
labor structure is unimportant to growth. However, our empirical findings, coupled
with our biophysical model, lead to exactly the opposite conclusion: labor structure
change is fundamentally connected to changes in energy consumption (our metric
for biophysical growth).
The basic insight of our model is that productivity gains and output constraints
can be used to provide a simple explanation of labor structure change. Productiv-
ity gains in the hypercycle (the portion of the economy that produces goods) are
always met by an increase in facilitation activity (i.e. services). In agriculture, out-
put is constrained by population, which grows much more slowly than agricultural
productivity. Thus, decreases in the agricultural employment share go hand in hand
with increases in agricultural productivity. In industry, the matter is complicated,
but we found that both the global economy and the United States showed essentially
no trend between energy use per capita and industrial labor share. This is consistent
with the (improbable) modelled scenario in which the industrial productivity growth
rate is equal to the growth rate of energy use per capita.
The key strength of this model lies in its explicit linkage between energy con-
sumption and productivity. Since productivity gains can be tied to increases in en-
ergy consumption per worker, we can state that increases in energy consumption
are the key engine of structural change. Note, however, that causation need not be
linear. While we can state that the growth of energy consumption allows for struc-
tural change, we can also state that structural change is required for increases in
energy consumption to occur. As Giampietro et al. (2012) note, this circularity (or
‘impredicativity’) is a key feature of complex systems. It means that establishing
linear causation becomes difficult, if not impossible.
More than 70 years ago, Colin Clark wrote that “the most important concomitant
of economic progress” is “the movement of working population from agriculture
to manufacture, and from manufacture to commerce and services” (1940, p. 176).
Contrary to the neoclassical vision in which changes in sectoral composition are a
“relatively unimportant byproduct of growth” (Echevarria, 1997, p. 431), the empir-
ical and theoretical work conducted in this chapter tends to support Clark’s view.
Perhaps the most compelling reason for understanding sectoral change is that
current trends will likely not continue indefinitely. The evidence suggests that the
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demographic inversion that is characteristic of highly industrialized nations (Fig.
5.1) is possible only through an immense mobilization of mostly fossil fuel energy.
Any decline in the energy supply will render this configuration inoperative. Given
this impending future, it is of great importance that we understand the relation be-
tween energy consumption and sectoral composition. While the simple model of
sectoral change used in this chapter was good for fitting historical data, it is not suit-
able for modelling the future. To do this, a systems model is needed – one that takes
into consideration the interaction between sectors. Such a model should have only
one exogenous input – the scale of the total fossil fuel stock.
However, there is one prediction that can be made without a model: any sig-
nificant and long-lasting decline in per capita energy consumption will likely be
associated with an increase in the agricultural share of employment and a decline in
the service share of employment.
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Chapter 6
Towards a Biophysical Growth Theory
We’ve been ... trained to think of economics as being about money,
and to some degree it is. But fundamentally it’s about stuff. And if it’s
about stuff, why are we studying it as a social science? Why are we
not, at least equally, studying it as a biophysical science?
– Charles Hall (quoted in Inman, 2013)
Having conducted an extensive investigation into the empirical realities of growth,
we are now in a situation to make some important decisions. I argue that it is time
to abandon neoclassical growth theory. Below, I review the basic problems with
neoclassical theory. I then argue that a biophysical growth theory is needed and I
present a set of ‘stylized facts’ that such a theory must explain. I conclude by re-
viewing some of the basic reasons why such a theory is a timely endeavour.
6.1 The Problem with Neoclassical Growth Theory
This book tested four implicit assumptions made by neoclassical growth theory:
1. Economic output can become decoupled from energy inputs.
2. Economic distribution is unrelated to growth.
3. Large institutions are not important for growth.
4. Labor force structure is not important for growth.
In all cases, the empirical evidence directly contradicted these assumptions. For
those who think that a scientific theory should be based on empirically grounded
facts, this critique alone provides compelling reasons to abandon neoclassical growth
theory. But while the specific arguments in this book are new, critiques of neoclassi-
cal assumptions are not. Indeed, voluminous literature exists that questions the ve-
racity of neoclassical assumptions (for instance: Robinson, 1953 1962; Georgescu-
Roegen, 1971; Leontief, 1971; Mirowski, 1991; Hall et al., 2001; Hall and Klitgaard,
2012; Keen, 2001 Nitzan & Bichler 2009; 2011). However convincing one may find
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this literature, it has not convinced very many neoclassical theorists to abandon their
theory.
There are many possible reasons for the doggedness with which neoclassical the-
orists adhere to their theory. When faced with criticism of their theory, perhaps the
most pervasive response given by the applied economists is simply that the theory
‘works’. Indeed, the one sector production function is ubiquitous in applied macro-
economics, and neoclassical economists would not continue to use it if it did not
give ‘good results’. However, these ‘good results’ in no way vindicate neoclassical
theory.
The first aspect of these ‘good results’ is that aggregate production functions can
be used to accurately fit historical GDP data. Unfortunately, a simple exponential
function of time (Yr ∝ eat ) can also be used to fit such data. For instance, a func-
tion with a constant growth rate of 3.5 % fits historical US GDP with an accuracy
of R2 = 0.98 (between 1929-2011, data from the BEA). But it would be ludicrous
to conclude that growth is an inevitable function of time. And yet, inside almost
every aggregate neoclassical production function is a technological progress term
that is nothing but an exponential function of time. While this exponential function
is attributed to ‘technological progress’, such a term cannot be measured indepen-
dently of neoclassical theory (and is usually assigned to the unexplained residual
in conventional Cobb-Douglas equations). Thus, under the logic ‘use something if
it works’, Occam’s razor would suggest that we use a pure exponential function of
time to explain GDP: we need not bother with capital and labor inputs at all.
The second aspect of these ‘good results’ is that aggregate production functions
“reinforce the marginal productivity theory ... of distribution”(Solow, 1987, p. 16-
17; cited in Shaikh, 2005, p. 447). Neoclassical theory predicts that the exponents in
the Cobb-Douglas production function should be equal to the share of labor and cap-
ital in the national income. Thus, ‘good results’ mean that regressions for the Cobb-
Douglas exponents are very close to the values predicted by neoclassical theory. Yet
as the work of Fisher (1971), Shaikh (1974), and McCombie (2001) demonstrate,
these ‘good results’ occur because the Cobb-Douglas form is an algebraic manipu-
lation of the national accounts identity – the formula used by statistical agencies to
define GDP. Thus, Shaikh writes that it is “impossible to distinguish the neoclassi-
cal argument from a mere tautology” (2005, p. 449). Therefore, the ‘good results’
of neoclassical growth theory mean precisely nothing.
To conclude, the shortcomings of neoclassical growth theory can be summarized
as follows:
1. It does not explain the phenomenon for which it is designed to explain. The
majority of growth is attributed to the ‘Solow-residual’, which is an inter-
nalized error function. Neoclassical economists model the residual with an
exponential function of time. However, if resorting to a function of time, Oc-
cam’s razor would suggest that we discard the remainder of the production
function in favor of a pure function of time.
2. There are fundamental problems associated with the measurement of the the-
ory’s basic variables (output and capital input). The accepted method is to
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measure capital and output quantities by way of monetary value. However,
such an approach requires making inherently subjective decisions, since the
underlying unit (price) is not well-defined. Moreover, it appears that the cur-
rent approach to measuring capital and output may be circularly dependent
on neoclassical theory. Therefore, such metrics are inappropriate for testing
neoclassic theory.
3. Its implicit assumptions are directly contradicted by empirical evidence.
Rather than being ‘innocuously’ untrue, the implicit assumptions made by
neoclassical theory are ‘insidiously’ untrue. The theory excludes from its
scope some of the most fundamental aspects of growth. Thus neoclassical
growth theory maintains simplicity by courting irrelevance.
4. The remaining empirical support for the theory is tautological. The strong
empirical results on which neoclassical growth theory purportedly rests nei-
ther elucidate the underlying technical form of the economy nor provide sup-
port for the marginal productivity theory of distribution. Instead, they are the
result of a tautological relation between the production function form and an
algebraic transformation of the national accounts identity.
Where, then, does this leave neoclassical growth theory? It seems fair to conclude
that it is an elegant mathematical construct that has little to do with the real world.
6.2 A Biophysical Approach
Given the inadequacy of neoclassical theory, what is the best alternative? As should
be obvious by now, I think that a biophysical approach to growth theory provides
the most suitable way forward. Such a theory must begin by asking a very simple
question, but one that is not often asked in economic theory: why do we have growth
at all? Indeed, growth is such an ephemeral phenomenon in the history of humanity
that its very existence should be surprising. In my opinion, satisfying theories about
the origins of growth do not come from economics, but from thermodynamics and
the study of complex systems. In order to understand why growth exists, I propose
that we need only two hypotheses:
1. All complex, non-equilibrium systems must be sustained by flows of energy
and/or matter. Increases in these flows allow the system to expand.
2. An industrial economy is a non-equilibrium system that is energetically sus-
tained primarily by exploitation of the finite stock of fossil fuels.
Growth, then, is possible whenever a new energy source is made available. Prior
to industrialization, technological constraints prevented humans from exploiting
fossil fuel energy. However, once sufficient technology existed, a feedback-loop set
in. Previously harvested resources and energy were transformed into technology that
was powered by fossil fuels and which generated enough surplus to not only power
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the economy but to exploit further fuels. Continuous iteration of this loop led to
exponential growth.
What is the simplest way to model this feedback-loop? Bardi and Lavacchi
(2009) have shown that the famous Lotka-Volterra equations (which are usually
used to model predator-prey dynamics) can be adapted to model the resource ex-
ploitation process:
R˙ =−k1T R (6.1)
T˙ = k2T R− k3T (6.2)
Here R represents a resource stock and T represents a stock of technological in-
frastructure. Equation 6.1 states that the rate at which the resource is harvested (R˙)
depends upon the size of the technological stock, the size of the resource stock, and
the efficiency of resource extraction (k1). This equation indicates that a greater tech-
nological stock can accelerate resource exploitation, but as the size of the resource
stock dwindles (as R decreases), the pace of resource exploitation will slow.
Equation 6.2 states that harvested resources are transformed into technology. The
rate of this transformation (T˙ ) is dictated by the rate of resource harvest (T R) and
the efficiency of the transformation process (k2). Additionally, technology (and its
instruments) is subject to entropic decay (−k3T ) at a rate determined by k3.
Biophysical growth, as I have defined it in this book, is the increase in the rate
at which resources (specifically energy) flow through the economy. Thus, in Bardi
and Lavacchi’s model, biophysical growth is represented by the rate of resource
extraction (R˙). A robust feature of this model is that it produces bell-shaped resource
extraction curves through time (like the one shown in Figure 1.1). Thus, the essential
insights of this model are: 1) growth can be modelled in terms of a feedback-loop
between technology and natural resource extraction; and 2) the ultimate growth limit
is set by the size of the finite stock of resources.
This model gives some analytic rigor to the peak and decline scenario envisioned
at the outset of the book. But while it indicates that a future energy consumption
curve might be bell-shaped, it does not indicate how a future energy decline will
affect society. It is also important to distinguish between external and internal con-
straints to growth. External (resource) constraints can describe the long-run behavior
of the economy, but internal (social) constraints dominate the short-run. Historical
crises have almost all been due to internal, social dynamics (think of the Great De-
pression). Even with the imposition of external, biophysical constraints, there is
little reason to think that complex social dynamics will cease to be of importance
in the future. Thus, an understanding of the future will require models, but also
in-depth empirical study of the past.
What is needed is a biophysical research agenda – one that seeks to systemati-
cally understand the relation between energy consumption and all aspects of human
society. Energy scholars such as Ayres and Warr (2009), Giampietro et al. (2012),
Hall and Klitgaard (2012) and Smil (2010) have made significant contributions on
this front, but much more work is needed.
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6.3 Stylized Biophysical Facts
As I stated at the outset of the book, a good starting point for a new theory is to
investigate the assumptions made by existing theory. If the results of this book tell
us nothing else, it is that a good starting place for a biophysical growth theory is
to begin with what neoclassical theory ignores. Neoclassical growth theory ignores
the role of energy, yet the expansion of energy consumption is the single most im-
portant aspect of growth. Neoclassical growth theory ignores distribution, yet we
found that distribution is fundamentally connected to growth. Neoclassical growth
theory ignores large institutions, yet such institutions play a central role in growth.
Neoclassical theory ignores changes in labor structure, yet changes in this structure
are essential to growth.
A theory is always the product of the phenomena it seeks to explain. What does
neoclassical growth theory seek to explain? Nearly 60 years ago, Nicholas Kaldor
(1957) outlined six statements that came to be known as the ‘Kaldor facts’ of eco-
nomic growth. In many ways, the goal of neoclassical growth theory has been to
explain these facts. Kaldor’s facts can be paraphrased as follows:
1. Output per worker grows at a roughly constant rate that does not de-
crease over time.
2. Capital per worker increases over time.
3. The capital/output ratio is roughly constant.
4. The rate of return to capital is roughly constant.
5. The share of capital and labor in net income are roughly constant.
6. Labor productivity growth rates vary considerably between societies.
Notice that 5 out of 6 of these facts are concerned with either something that re-
mains ‘constant’ (facts 1, 3, 4, 5) and/or something that ‘grows over time’ (facts 1,
2). The logical offspring of these facts is a theory in which growth is constant and
inevitable (i.e. neoclassical growth theory). Notice also the focus on capital. Neo-
classical growth theory places capital at the center of its explanation of growth, but
never bothers to explain where capital comes from. This neglect is likely the result
of the neoclassical duality of capital (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009). Note that when one
applies compound interest to financial capital, the financial stock will grow expo-
nentially. Neoclassical theory takes the logic of financial capital and applies it to the
physical capital stock. Yet such a stock cannot be self-perpetuating – the laws of
thermodynamics forbid it (Soddy, 1926). Neoclassical theory fails to see that phys-
ical capital (i.e. a technological stock) is primarily a means for converting energy
into useful work. Without an energy flow, physical capital cannot fulfil its purpose
(think of a tractor without fuel).
By focusing on constant and inevitable growth driven by the accumulation of
capital, neoclassical theory set itself on the wrong course from the very beginning.
The focus of a growth theory should be on energy. Energy is the driving force that
sustains all biophysical systems. While natural scientists have known this for years,
theoretical inertia has prevented this simple fact from penetrating economic theory.
But as Hall et al. note, “economics is too important to leave to the economists”
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(2001, p. 663). It is time to begin constructing a growth theory that has a firm bio-
physical basis.
The goal of a biophysical growth theory should be to understand how changes in
energy consumption affect society. In an attempt to focus the development of such
a theory, I use the empirical evidence found in preceding chapters to propose the
following seven stylized biophysical facts.
Seven Stylized Biophysical Facts:
Trends accompanying increases in energy use per capita:
1. Large institutions (corporations and governments) increase their employment
share. (Section 4.3)
2. Agricultural employment decreases. (Section 5.5)
3. Service employment increases. (Section 5.5)
Trends accompanying increases in the energy use per capita growth rate:
1. The value of production increases relative to the price of energy. (Section 2.4)
2. The share of profit in national income increases. (Section 3.2)
3. Debt claims decrease relative to the value of production. (Section 3.3)
4. Downward income redistribution is more likely to occur. (Section 3.4)
A good starting point for a biophysical growth theory is to attempt to explain
these seven stylized biophysical facts in a way that is both internally coherent and
consilient with accepted scientific knowledge. I have offered my own thoughts and
theories on the trends presented above, but the truth is that much remains unex-
plained. Acknowledging our ignorance, however, is the first step of any fruitful sci-
entific inquiry.
6.4 Conclusions
Supposing one accepts my assertion that neoclassical growth theory does not de-
scribe reality, and one accepts the hypothesis that energy and material flows (and
the technology that enables them) form the basis for all growth, one could still ob-
ject to the need for a biophysical growth theory on a number of grounds.
Firstly, despite the fact that fossil fuels are finite on any meaningful human time-
scale, one might argue that their scale is so vast that the peak of production is a
distant worry. In order to make meaningful predictions about such a peak, we need
to know both the size and quality of the total fossil fuel stock. This is a difficult busi-
ness that is currently the topic of a lively debate in energy literature. While recent
empirical work suggests that the peak of conventional oil is occurring now1(Hallock
et al, 2014; Campbell, 2009), estimates on recoverable coal vary widely Hook et al
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Fig. 6.1 National Energy Use per Capita as a Multiple of the Global Average
Sources: Global energy consumption (1800-1960) from Vaclav Smil (2010). All non-US data after
1965 from BP Statistical Review of Energy 2013 (1965-present). US data from EIA Table E1
(1795-1945) and Table 1.3 (1949-2011). UK data from Paul Warde (2007). Population data from
Maddison (2008) (1800-1960) and World Bank Development Indicators (1961-2010).
(2010); Mohr and Evans (2009); Patzek and Croft (2010); Rutledge (2010). There-
fore, it is not quite clear that a peak in total fossil fuel production is imminent (al-
though it does seem quite clear that it is occurring for higher quality fuels and for
many geographical areas; see Hall and Klitgaard, 2012).
Secondly, one might object that I have written off renewable energy. The future
of renewable energy is difficult to predict. To date, though, renewable energy con-
sumption (solar PV and wind) remains trivial – about 1% of total primary energy
consumption . However, it is conceivable that some game-changing, Promethean
technology may arrive (like nuclear fusion, or a tremendous commitment to wind)
that will completely replace fossil fuels. While I am not holding my breath, the
possibility cannot be ruled out entirely.
Even if a forced energy decline is not imminent, I argue that there are still reasons
why a biophysical growth theory is of immediate importance. Perhaps the foremost
reason is that there is currently a fundamental shift occurring in the international
pattern of energy consumption. Figure 6.1 shows historical per capita energy con-
sumption of the UK, US, Japan, China, and Korea, expressed as a ratio of the global
average.
In this chart we see the rise and relative decline of Britain during the 19th century,
while we see the absolute dominance of US energy consumption rates during the
1 Technically speaking, a peak in production can be determined only in hindsight. Therefore, the
most accurate statement we can make is that oil production is growing much, much more slowly
than in the past.
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20th century. However, as of the turn of the 21st century, US energy dominance is in
unprecedented retreat. In fact, the major Western powers are now all experiencing a
relative decline. On the other hand, Eastern nations, such as China and South Korea,
are experiencing rapid increases in energy consumption. This trend has immediate
repercussions, and a biophysical approach is absolutely necessary for making sense
of it. However, quality biophysical research requires quality biophysical data. One
simple policy recommendation that can be made by a biophysical growth theory
is a reimplementation of a national program of collecting biophysical as well as
monetary data on the economy on at least the scale and quality that the US was
undertaking routinely in the 1970s and 1980s.
On a more philosophical front, a biophysical growth theory is desirable because
it starts from an energetics basis. As Chaisson (2002) notes, energy is the “universal
currency” of the natural sciences. One of the great projects of science has been the
unification of knowledge. A biophysical growth theory has the potential to offer a
bridge between the natural and social sciences – something that is desirable in its
own right.
Whether for practical or philosophical reasons, a biophysical growth theory is an
important endeavor. The task now is to begin constructing it.
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Appendix A
US Sectors: Methodology and Sources
Data for Sectoral Corporate Concentration
Corporate Employment
Employment of top 100/200 corporations (ranked by number of employees) is from
COMPUSTAT database (series DATA29). Primary & Secondary sector is defined as
SIC codes less than 3999, while the Service sector is defined as SIC codes between
4000 and 8999.
Total Sectoral Employment
Data for Primary & Secondary Sectors is from BEA Tables 6.5 B-D, Full-time
Equivalent Employees by Industry. Employment data for private service sector from
BLS online, series CES0800000001. See Figure A.2 for the composition of these
sectors.
Energy Consumption per Labor Hour
Energy
Sector energy consumption is from EIA Table 2.1a, Energy Consumption Estimates
by Sector. However, following the methodology developed by Giampietro, Mayumi,
and Sorman (in The Metabolic Pattern of Societies: Where Economists Fall Short)
the EIA categories are reorganized into more functional end-use categories (Fig.
A.1). Giampietro et al. call this the MuSIASEM approach (multi-scale integrated
analysis of societal and ecosystem metabolism).
This re-categorization mainly involves the reallocation of transportation sector
energy consumption to the household and service sector. Energy used for non-work
related personal vehicle use is allocated to the household sector and is calculated
using equation A.1 (where VMT stands for vehicle mile trips).
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Household Transportation =
Non-work Related VMT
Total VMT
· (Personal Vehicle Energy Use) (A.1)
All remaining transportation energy is allocated to the service sector. Data for
vehicle mile trips is from the 2009 National Household Travel Survey, Table 6.
Data between points is interpolated linearly while data prior to 1969 is extrapolated
linearly from the 1969-83 trend. Data for personal vehicle energy consumption for
the period 1970-2010 is derived from numerous editions of the EIA Annual Energy
Outlook using Light-Duty Vehicle energy consumption. Data for the period 1949-69
uses fuel consumption for passenger car & 4-tire vehicles from the Department of
Transportation, Table VM-201A.
Note: the category 4-tire vehicles is introduced in 1966 at a non-zero value. Data
prior to 1966 is estimated by exponential extrapolation.
EIA End-Use
Sectors
MuSIASEM
End-Use Sectors
Residential
Transportation
Commercial
Industrial
Services & 
Government
Household
Primary & Secondary
Sectors
Non-work related
personal vehicle
trips
All other transport
Fig. A.1 Recategorizing Energy Consumption
Labor Hours
Sectoral labor hours are from BEA Tables 6.8 A-D (Persons Engaged in Pro-
duction). All values are indexed to Table 6.8 C and multiplied by 40 hr/week×
52.1775 weeks/year. Note that the service sector is defined to include government.
This is because energy statistics do not distinguish between private and public con-
sumption. See Figure A.2 for of MuSIASEM sectors onto subsectors.
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Fig. A.2 Mapping MuSIASEM Sectors onto Subsectors
